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ABSTRACT
A FRESH APPROACH TO ANALYZING
JOHN MCPECK'S CONCEPTION OF CRITICAL THINKING
by
Debra Anne Boussey
John McPeck's conception of critical thinking, as
developed in Critical Thinking and Education, has had a
profound effect upon the Critical Thinking Movement.

With

its allegiance to subject-specificity and epistemology
rather than to a generalized set of skills, it has forced
theorists in the movement to consider possibilities they
either missed or ignored.

Such theorists have found it

necessary to confront McPeck's conception and his arguments
before they can satisfactorily justify their own.
In the critical thinking literature, however, theorists
tend to dismiss the positive contributions he has made
and to attack the arguments McPeck makes about individual
points.

They mistakenly believe that that approach will

invalidate his whole project.
I contend that McPeck's conception of critical thinking
depends on three things: a three premise argument that
concludes critical thinking is conceptually linked to
epistemology, two definitions, and ten features that outline
iv
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what critical thinking does and does not include.

The

above can be understood independently; however, it is only
when they act in concert that they comprise McPeck's
conception of critical thinking.

I further contend that

critical thinking is explained in terms of other related
concepts, such as rationality and epistemology, that also
rest on the tenets of McPeck's main argument.
I will show that the above interdependence leads to
two maladies - inconsistency and imprecision.

His

conception is inconsistent inasmuch as the argument for
critical thinking leads to the conclusion that

there are

as many concepts of critical thinking as there are subjects.
The imprecision of critical thinking and

the other concepts

upon which it depends contributes to the inconsistency
by creating an atmosphere in which it is possible to derive
many concepts of critical thinking and by themselves
becoming many concepts rather than one overriding concept.

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

To My Parents: Doris and Henry Boussey

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A B S T R A C T ..............................................

iv

D E D I C A T I O N ............................................

vi

Chapter
1.

MCPECK'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITICAL
THINKING MOVEMENT ..............................
Challenging the Standard Approach

2.

3.

1
6

THE MEANING OF 'CRITICAL THINKING1................ 12
The Relationship Between Generalized
Skills and Critical Thinking

15

The Relationship Between SubjectSpecificity, Epistemology and
Critical Thinking

24

McPeck's Definitions of Critical Thinking

35

The Features of Critical Thinking

48

Summary

64

THE ANALYSIS OF MCPECK'S CONCEPTION OF
CRITICAL THINKING ............................

67

Subjects, Fields, Domains, and Disciplines

71

Reasons and Fallacies

75

The Analogous Situation Between Rationality
Epistemology, and Critical Thinking

82

The Relationship Between Argument Analysis,
Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

86

Harvey Siegel on McPeck's Conceptualization
of Epistemology

93

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Consequences of Interlocking Concepts
Summary
4.

97
11 3

CONCLUSION: BACK TO BASICS...................

116

Rebuilding the Foundation

11 8

McPeck's Conclusion Versus MyConclusion

124

Overall Assessment

125

NOTES.................................................

127

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...................

137

VITA AUCTORIS.........................................

146

viii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER ONE
MCPECK'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITICAL THINKING MOVEMENT
After two thousand years of domination, evidence
strongly suggests that formal logic has been deposed as
the only paradigm of good reasoning.

Its dominant position

was washed away in a revolution that was slow in coming,
yet inexorable once it began.

The movements counter to

formal logic basically charged that it was incapable of
assessing arguments in their natural settings, that" it
could not handle so-called 'everyday' arguments.

The

basic tenets behind this revolution took hold only in the
last three decades.

Once the justice of those charges

was recognized, reform became inevitable.
I say 'movements' rather than 'movement' because two
identifiable movements have emerged from the revolution
- the critical thinking movement and the informal logic
movement.

The above are largely treated as distinct yet
2
complementary.
Regardless of the exact nature of the

relationship between the critical thinking movement (CTM)
and the informal logic movement (ILM), they have attained
as prominent a position as formal logic in theories on
evaluating arguments.^
The time for revolution, however, has passed and today
1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2
we are in an evolutionary stage.

Granted, people accept

the existence of a concept called critical thinking.
Granted, people accept the existence of a concept called
informal logic.

What is not fully accepted is the nature

of the former concepts.

What are their boundaries?

assumptions lie at their hearts?
to one another?

What

How are they related

How are they related to formal logic?

Can they be taught?

Should they be taught?

If so, how?

Ever since Ennis published "A Concept of Critical Thinking
A Proposed Basis For Research in Teaching and Evaluation
of Critical Ability" in 1962, proponents of critical
thinking and informal logic have been trying to come to
grips with these questions and with their colleagues'
theories.

The concepts of critical thinking and informal

logic have both been evolving.
Currently we are in a state of flux, since no one
conception of critical thinking has managed to achieve
dominance over any of the others.

Even the most prominent

contributors like Ennis and Paul are still modifying their
conceptions as their ideas evolve and as their ideas are
challenged.

It seems to me that they are all seeking some

way of explaining what is already there.
In The Concept of Mind (1955), Gilbert Ryle pointed
out that Aristotle did not invent logic and syllogisms.
He gave names and overt formulations to things that people
already knew were there and which they already used with
proficiency.

Aristotle's originality sprang from his
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3
recognition of the existence of logic and from the
formulation of how it and its component parts function.
It is my contention that members of the two movements
believe that they are doing for critical thinking and
informal logic what Aristotle did for formal logic.

In

"Critical Thinking and the 'Trivial Pursuit' Theory of
Knowledge," John McPeck says
. . . at times, my general view about the nature
of critical thinking seems so obvious and
commonsensical to me that it is almost
embarrassing that it need be said at all,
particularly to the learned audience for whom
it was originally intended . . . The view of
critical thinking which I have been defending
simply tries to account for certain common, and
what I thi^k obvious, facts about human
reasoning.
The theorists in both traditions have accomplished
the first step by recognizing the existence of critical
thinking and informal logic.

The second step, formulating

and articulating how critical thinking and informal logic
are conceived and how they operate, is the problem.

A

consensus has not been formed on all of the important
points.

Each theorist believes that his conception is

the correct one and that he has, for the most part,
described the way things actually operate when assessing
natural or 'everyday' arguments and situations.
In reviewing the literature on critical thinking I
found that a broad pattern emerged.

The first stage

consisted of Robert Ennis's work and the reviews,
criticisms, and 'advances' that followed.

His work was
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4
one of the real launching points for the CTM.

In the early

years of the movement anyone writing about critical thinking
had to deal with his loose characterization of the
components of critical thinking.

The literature reveals

that for many years, Ennis's work dominated the movement.
If this were not the case most of the people in the field
would not have felt compelled to correct, improve on, or
quote him.

In almost everything that I have found on the

subject, even from recent years, Ennis's contributions
have been cited.

He erected the primary pattern for

approaching critical thinking in "A Concept of Critical
Thinking" where he listed the skills that he believed to
5

be essential to critical thinking.

Understandably the

list has altered over time and his analyses of critical
thinking have become more developed
Although Ennis remains a valued contributor, currently
a dominant voice is that of Richard Paul who has taken
Ennis's skills-and-dispositions account of critical
thinking, acknowledged its worth, and concluded that it
is not enough without an awareness of 'world views' in
which we are all embedded and which shape and affect our

g
responses and critical abilities.

Again, the literature

reflects this shift.
There is one other stage that I have noticed and that
is not, strictly speaking, a stage at all inasmuch as it
neither builds on nor acts as the beginning of a chain
of thought.

This 'stage', which is the important one for
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the purpose of this thesis, does not follow Paul nor does
it precede Ennis; rather, it permeates them.

We might

look at McPeck's place as the counter-culture of the 1960's
whose ideas and actions reverbated throughout the dominant
culture and whose effects are being felt even today.
However you choose to put it, John McPeck, like Ennis and
Paul, must be contended with.

His primary work, Critical

Thinking and Education, and its theme, critical thinking
as subject, domain or discipline-specific, cannot be
ignored.
During Ennis's dominant phase, commentators attempted
to reconcile his approach with the criticisms and
suggestions McPeck leveled against it.

When he could not

be reconciled, some would claim his criticisms were largely
meaningless since the standard approach implicitly dealt
with them.

When Paul's star ascended in the movement,

the literature shifted from an Ennis versus McPeck stance
to a Paul versus McPeck stance.

McPeck simply cannot be

ignored.
I like to think of the three in a familial
relationship.

Ennis is the grandfather who founded a small

family business.

He founded it, nurtured it, and still

plays a role in it.

Paul is the dutiful son who joined

the family business and who, with great zeal, built on
its foundations to expand its market and improve its product
line.

He is the father of the business who has nurtured

sons and daughters of his own to continue the families'
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work.

6
McPeck is the prodigal son who, with an equal amount

of zeal, decided the foundations of the family business
rested on shaky ground and needed to be torn down and remade
in a similar, yet different, image.

Since his family

refused to allow him and his destructive tendencies into
the heart of the family business, he built his own.
business is smaller, but offers stiff competition.

His
The

third generation may see the worth of both and be able
to effect a merger, if one is at all possible, and if Uncle
McPeck is incorrect in thinking that their business
practices are incompatible.

I hope to resolve, or at the

very least come closer to a resolution of which business
will fail or whether a merger is possible, before this
inquiry is complete.
Challenging the Standard Approach
Why focus on McPeck?
or Lipman?

Why not Ennis, Paul, Siegel,

Why not try to get a handle on critical thinking

by examining the standard approach, since it is the dominant
account?

It is precisely because the standard approach

is the standard and dominant approach that I have decided
not to go that route.

A great deal has already been written

from that viewpoint and being so immersed those writers
do not always see where their biggest problems lie.

It

takes someone like McPeck, who is as interested in the
topic as those taking the standard approach and who does
not buy into it, to see the weaknesses.

He puts it under
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the proverbial microscope and forces its proponents to
face the weaknesses and try to deal with them.

Even if

McPeck's approach to critical thinking turns out to be
wrong-headed, he has made a large contribution to the
movement by forcing this confrontation.

He has brought

a refreshing vitality to the literature and to the critical
thinking movement.

A radical is, if nothing else,

interesting.
Apart from being drawn by McPeck's radical position,
the content of his ideas on critical thinking also entices
me.

What if he is correct in holding that critical thinking

is subject or domain-specific?

What if he is correct in

saying that it cannot be taught as if one course nurtures
skills applicable across subjects?
staggering.

The consequences are

Every school that has set up a critical

thinking program based on these mistaken assumptions wastes
time and effort.

The students waste time and effort

attempting to inculcate skills and dispositions that will
not make them proficient, critical reasoners.

The teachers

waste time preparing for and teaching something that is
meant to be useful and turns out not to be when they could
be teaching and preparing courses so that they are useful
and do produce critical thinkers.

All that waste from

a misapprehension of the underlying nature of critical
thinking!
Moreover, if it turns out that all the above is true
and that McPeck's version of critical thinking eliminates
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the opposition, the hardest part of McPeck's enterprise
would have to begin.

He tells us that a liberal education

7

is the answer.

Realistically that tells us nothing.

The teachers, researchers, or philosophers interested in
critical thinking would have to determine what

'skills'

count as critical in each subject/discipline/domain.
Furthermore, they would still be left with the question
of how to inculcate the commensurate 'skills', assuming
of course that they decide critical thinking can be taught
and is not acquired by osmosis nor. yet is inborn.
Finally and most importantly, I took up the challenge
contained in a comment by Perry Weddle.

In "McPeck's

Critical Thinking and Education" he says, "What makes the
emergence of an intellectual movement into adulthood might
be said to be the movement's surviving its first major
challenge.

McPeck's

Critical Thinking and Education is

Q

the challenge."

I concur.

McPeck did provide a great

challenge to the critical thinking movement's standard
approach.

However, he speaks of McPeck's challenge as

if it is over.

The defenders of the movement supposedly

faced the infidel and smote him.

I doubt this very much.

None of my research indicates that McPeck has ever been
satisfactorily routed.

While he has lost some battles,

he has won too - the war rages on.

This thesis constitutes

one skirmish in this ongoing conflict.
The difference between my predecessors'

(Paul, and

Siegel among others) attempts to handle McPeck's arguments
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for his conception of critical thinking and my own resides
in our different approaches.

They address individual points

that McPeck offers, in an effort to submarine his entire
enterprise.

What they succeed in sometimes doing is

torpedoing those individual points but not the concept
itself.

I intend to address the sum of the arguments McPeck

offers, the individual arguments as they perform in
conjunction with each other— an overview if you will— and
show that the consequences of his arguments lead to an
interpretation of critical thinking that McPeck does not
intend.

In effect his arguments supporting his conception

of critical thinking invalidates his conception of critical
thinking.

The project then is to analyze the McPeckian

concept of critical thinking (italics mine).

I shall

contend that his arguments lead inexorably to the conclusion
that there cannot be a concept of critical thinking but
many, and it follows that his stated project crumbles
because he claims to be analyzing an overriding concept,
not a series of concepts whose natures may alter in given
contexts.
Do not misunderstand me.

McPeck offers many good

points regarding the nature of critical thinking.

These

points emerge both when he is criticizing other views of
the concept and when he is building the proper atmosphere
for his own concept to function in adequately.

The

literature tends to overlook the positive aspects of
McPeck's work in favour of highlighting the negative ones.
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When the good points are acknowledged, they are usually
brushed over as if they are obvious and had been included
from the beginning.

Oftentimes, other contributors credit

him only with stressing something that was purportedly
embodied in their own constructions.

By devaluing the

points originality they devalue McPeck's importance as
a contributor to the CTM.

By acknowledging the justice

of some of his points they appear to be taking his
criticisms to heart and can largely ignore the more
contentious criticisms.
In this thesis I intend to draw McPeck's conclusions
and their consequences out into the open and show how and
why they invalidate his own project.

However, I will also

spotlight the good points in his project, which show
throughout Critical Thinking and Education, and show why
they are good points and how they may serve as a base for
a reformulation of his conception of critical thinking.
I am not interested in empirically verifying or disproving
his theory by citing study after study - both sides do
this and it has taken theorists nowhere.

One of the issues

McPeck addresses is the validity of such studies based
on critical thinking tests.

One problem he mentions is

that it is unclear what is actually being tested for critical thinking skills, reading skills, or intelligence?
This thesis will be presented in three interlocking
sections.

The second chapter deals with the first two

chapters of Critical Thinking and Education where McPeck
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develops his concept of critical thinking and the conditions
under which it operates.

We cannot understand why he

invalidates his own concept if we do not know what he
conceives critical thinking to be and why.

The third

chapter builds on the second, outlining where his
conclusions lead him astray and how they invalidate his
own project.

The last chapter highlights the positive

aspects in McPeck's arguments and offers an overall
assessment of his analysis, arguing that he has failed
in his goal to provide the analysts of critical thinking,
and asking what caused this failure, and what he can do
about it - if anything.
This thesis covers McPeck's contributions from 1981,
when Critical Thinking and Education was released, to the
present day.

His latest book, Teaching Critical Thinking

is included.

However, my thesis will not comment on Chapter

5 of Critical Thinking and Education which focuses on Edward
de Bono.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MEANING OF 'CRITICAL THINKING1
John McPeck wrote Critical Thinking and Education
out of a need to present a clear analysis of the concept
of critical thinking.

We do not, he claims, have a clear

understanding of what the concept of critical thinking
entails.
The phrase 'critical thinking' is both
overworked and under-analyzed . . . Even
the more careful work that has been done
on critical thinking tends to rush over
the analysis of the basic concept and to
move on to itemizing the various skills
that it is thought to involve.
As a consequence, critical thinking can legitimately refer
to anything from logic to the ability to solve clever puzzle
games and can, so it is claimed, be inculcated in any one
of a number of ways.

Providing a list of skills as Ennis

does in his definitions is not enough since he nowhere
2
provides a justification for his view.
McPeck intends
to make up for this lack by providing the missing analysis.
McPeck dismisses the approach to critical thinking
typified by Robert Ennis, what I call the standard approachf
in which typically a definition, meant to apply to all
disciplines, is given along with a list of skills and/or
dispositions.

Edward D'Angelo, for example, also employs
12
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this pattern of explanation in The Teaching of Critical
Thinking.^

Even those, like Paul and Siegel, who do not

follow this precise pattern, assume the concept applies
to other disciplines and assume that a definition applicable
across disciplines is possible.

It is this common

assumption that identifies a theory as a standard approach
theory.
McPeck takes the opposite approach, arguing, as we
shall see, that the concept of critical thinking does not
exist as a discipline unto itself and that a list of generic
skills and/or dispositions is unworkable.

The two

approaches are, however, intertwined in his book.

In his

illustration of the concept, McPeck depends less upon a
positive analysis of the concept than on a negative one.
That is to say, the structure of Critical Thinking and
Education mainly revolves around his stating what is
misguided about the ‘standard approach' and why, and then
providing the correct approach.

We might view McPeck's

concept as the antithesis of the standard approach, since
it rejects the standard account's basic assumptions.

This

rejection will be clarified.
His conception of critical thinking rests on two basic
assumptions that act as the foundation of his theory.
The first assumption is that a concept of critical thinking
exists.

He is not seeking to establish that fact.

concern is with its nature.
subject-specific or not?

McPeck's

Is critical thinking

If it is, how does it manifest
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itself?
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How do we recognize and use it?

We have already

met the second assumption (p. 12) which says the standard
approach to critical thinking has not discovered how this
manifestation occurs.
The first two chapters of the book called "The Meaning
of Critical Thinking" and "Critical Thinking, Epistemology,
and Education," are devoted to the articulation of the
theoretical assumptions that comprise the actual foundation
and structure of his analysis.

Throughout these two

chapters, McPeck offers the conditions necessary for
critical thinking to flourish, and a step-by-step argument
leading to the conclusion that critical thinking is.
conceptually linked to epistemology.

He reaches this

conclusion by a three-premise main argument, each premise
of which is backed by a chain of supporting arguments.
The three main premises support the conclusion that critical
thinking is conceptually linked to epistemology.
argument is:
particular,

The main

(1) thinking is always about something in
(2) there is no generalized set of skill(s)

called critical thinking,

(3) critical thinking is

subject-specific, and therefore (C) critical thinking is
conceptually linked to epistemology.

We will examine this

reasoning in Sections I and II of this chapter.
McPeck provides two definitions that rest on the above
reasoning.

They do not provide content to the concept,

but indicate how the concept is to be applied.
how the concept functions.

They show

In addition to the definitions
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McPeck also provides ten features that outline the
conditions under which the definitions must operate.

They

establish limits or boundaries both for the concept itself
and for the definitions that arise from the concept.

I

will argue that McPeck's own concept is fundamentally
incoherent, but before I can do that, I need first to
explain that conception/analysis.

That explanation entails

examining the premises the conception, the definitions,
and the features - all of which comprise the conception.
(I ) The Relationship Between Generalized Skills
and Critical Thinking
First, we will look at the three premises and the
conclusion that I set out in the beginning of this chapter.
To simplify the discussion of these premises we will examine
the first two premises in Section I of this chapter and
the third premise and the conclusion in the following
Section.

Premises 1 and 2
The arguments underlying premise (1) arise because
McPeck wants to show why the standard approach fails and
mistakenly reifies critical thinking into a curriculum
subject.

The tenets of this argument run through much

of his work outside of Critical Thinking and Education;
namely,

"The Evaluation of Critical Thinking Programs;

Dangers and Dogmas," "Response to H. Siegel," "Critical
Thinking and the 'Trivial Pursuit' Theory of Knowledge,"
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and "Paul's Critique of Critical Thinking and Education."
The basic argument runs: thinking is always about
something in particular; to think of no particular thing
is equivalent to not thinking at all.

"it is a matter

of conceptual truth that thinking is always thinking about
X; and that X can never be 'everything in general' but
must always be something in particular."^

This line of

reasoning raises serious concerns about teachers' claims
that they teach thinking, that they teach students to think,
or that they teach thinking in general; and

yet critical

thinking is reified into a curriculum subject.
The standard approach fails because, as we shall see
in feature 7, theorists mistakenly emphasize 'critical'
as if critical thinking alters the nature and operation
of thinking; whereas, it really behaves like the term
'creative' which qualifies thinking and which, in itself,
5
does not describe what is being thought about.
'Precocious',

'imaginative', and 'sensitive' operate in

the same fashion.
If thinking is always about something . . . then
'critical thinking' per se is even more so, that
is, more transitive.
This is because critical
thinking as such, is a kind of higher-order
thinking about things . . . and is, therefore,
parasitic upon the original thing being thought
about.
When we drop the X we are left with "I teach
precocity," "I teach imagination," or "I teach creativity."
If it is argued that they are general skills, they must
be concomitants of other pursuits.
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since they are related to the way in which
something is done, not what is done
. . . Adding, the adjective 'critical' to
the phrase 'thinking about X' describes
in some general way how something is thought
about, but it does not describe that
something.
In isolation from a particular
subject, the phrase 'critical thinking1
neither refers to nor denotes any particular
skill . . . it makes no sense to talk about
critical thinking as a distinct subject
and that it therefore cannot be profitably
taught as such.
Since, McPeck concludes, critical thinking is not about
a specific X, and since critical thiking does no belong
to a distinct subject, it does not-make sense to say "I
teach critical thinking" because there is no generalized
g

skill properly called critical thinking.

Thinking and

critical thinking are bound to particular subjects and
activities.

The standard approach, which subscribes to

the notion of critical thinking simpliciter, is absurd
"because there are almost as many ways of thinking as there
are things to think about."
The argument that there is no such thing as thinking
in general and that thinking must be about some thing in
particular is one of the most contentious arguments that
McPeck presents.

In "Critical Thinking: How to Teach Good

Reasoning" Groarke and Tindale state that
People know how to think, perhaps, but they
do not understand the principles of thinking.
When they do, they will, we believe reason
more effectively . . . reasoning [which
Groarke and Tindale use interchangeably
with critical thinking] is, for us, like
writing skills.
Undergraduates can all,
presumably, write.
But many of ^ e m need
to develop their writing skills.
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Many counter-arguments theorists offer share one trait
- they depend on analogies to some other, presumably
general,

'activities' where courses exist to improve the

requisite skills.

Harvey Siegel's counter-argument provides

an example of how many theorists broach the subject and
where the disputants, McPeck and the standard approach
theorists, get derailed.

Siegel points out:

A given act of thinking may, as McPeck
suggests, always be about something or other;
it may make no sense to say of a given
episode of thinking that the .thinker was
thinking, but not about anything in
particular.
But it hardly follows from
this that thinking, conceived as a general
sort of activity which includes as instances
all cases of particular acts of thinking
about something — and such a conception
must be possible, on pain of inability to
identify all the specific acts as acts of
thinking — must itself be construed as
about something or other.
It is not the
case that the general activity of thinking
is 'logically connected to an X' any more
than the general activity of cycling is
logically.! connected to any particular
bicycle.
In his "Response to H. Siegel," McPeck challenges
the legitimacy of Siegel's analogy linking cycling with
thinking.

Cycling denotes a specific ability and has a

limited set of criteria for effectiveness.

It is not a

general activity except insofar as you can travel to
different places for different purposes.

Thinking does

not denote a specific ability nor does it have a finite
set of criteria for effectiveness.

As McPeck has said

elsewhere, there can be critical, creative, imaginative,
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sensitive, etc. thinking, each of which, presumably, has
its own set of criteria.

Different destinations and purposes do not
change the specific nature of the skill
of cycling.
But different problems and
purposes do change the inherent nature of
the skills required in thinking.
No one
set of skills can encompass 'thinking',
but one ^gt of skills does encompass
cycling.
McPeck's rejection of Siegel's analogy between cycling
and thinking seems valid and for the given reasons.
However, I think both have lost sight of the fact that
we are concerned with critical thinking, not thinking in
general.
Siegel, who believes that there are some skills linked
to critical thinking, such as identifying assumptions and
identifying fallacies, could admit that McPeck's charges
are telling ones, but not if he compares cycling with
critical thinking.

In Siegel's view the skills of critical

thinking have a limited, not an infinite, set of criteria
for effectiveness.

To be effective the criteria would

allow for minor adaptations to fit different situations,
but for effective cycling we need to make adjustments when
faced with different types of bicycles in different types
of terrain.

1 *3

Critical thinking skills would behave

slightly differently in history than in religion; a 'normal'
bicycle would behave differently on a dirt road than on
a paved one.

Riding a mountain bike in rough terrain is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20
different from riding a 10-speed on city streets.

And

so Siegel's analogy and criticism of McPeck's argument
is valid when cycling, a specific ability with a limited
set of criteria for effectiveness, is compared to critical
thinking, a specific type of thinking with a limited set
of criteria for effectiveness.
McPeck and the standard theorists are operating from
two different intuitions, if you will, regarding the nature
of critical thinking.

Or, as Selman puts it, "The dispute

seems to be the result of a failure to come to agreement
on a satisfactory way of conceptualizing the nature of
critical thinking and the concepts associated with it."1'*
McPeck's intuition tells him that critical thinking is
not a particular way of thinking with its own subject matter
and criteria,

'critical' is only used as a qualifier to

describe the type of thinking that is occurring.

Standard

theorists1 intuitions tell them 'critical' does not just
qualify thinking; critical thinking is a particular type
of thinking with criteria of its own and it can be taught
as a separate subject; therefore, they conclude, McPeck
must be mistaken in his assertion that thinking in general
and critical thinking in particular must be about some
X.
McPeck's argument that there is no thinking in general
leads to the conclusion there is no generalized set of
skills called critical thinking.
he comes to that conclusion.

We can easily see how

If thinking is always aimed
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at some X, then critical thinking, which is a particular
way of thinking,

is also aimed at some X.

'Critical'

describes how something is thought about; it does not
describe that something.

Since critical thinking is not

a something in itself and is dependent on particular X's
for its substance, it is not a generalized skill with its
own subject matter and criteria for its use.
Ennis disagrees with this conclusion on the grounds
that there are bridge-jumping general criteria such as
assumption identification, and detecting and avoiding
equivocation, etc. which do not depend on the subject.
However, it does not seem to me that McPeck would accept
Ennis's examples of bridge-jumping general criteria.

First,

what counts as an assumption, for example, depends on the
subject or field to which X belongs.

Second, to even find

an assumption you need a thorough working knowledge of
the field.

Without a thorough working knowledge you would

not know what constitutes an assumption in the field and
if you had some general definition for that field you would
not necessarily know how to apply it unless you understood
what makes something an assumption in that field and why
this particular claim constitutes an assumption.
amount of background understanding is implied.

16

A certain
General

prescriptions are unhelpful if you lack this necessary
knowledge.

McPeck continues by arguing that as we move

from the purely formal to the empirical mode a universal
standard becomes dimmer.

17
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McPeck offers some comments to show that there is
no empirical evidence to support critical thinking as a
generalized skill.

Most texts based on the standard view

focus on logic and fallacies with the rationale that by
gaining skill in their proper use students will know the
rudiments of critical thinking.

This view assumes a

transfer of training across disciplinary boundaries.
is evidence to the contrary.

McPeck refers
18

B. Hudgins in Learning and Thinking.

There

us to Bryce

In "Trivial Pursuit"

McPeck claims that almost all empirical studies on transfer
of training effects, particularly in the cognitive domain,
have been unpromising (italics mine).

19

In my own review

of material on transfer of training, I have seen studies
which claim that transfer does occur.

20

While I cannot

agree there is no empirical evidence supporting critical
thinking as a generalized skill, I can concede that there
is no definitive evidence either way.
McPeck has more to say on the subject of transfer
in "Stalking Beasts."

He warns that we should not confuse

'logical subsumption1 with

'psychological transfer'.

Simply because logical principles might apply does not
mean psychological transfer takes place between domains
and principles.

Some kinds of specific knowledge and

information will have greater transfer capacity, i.e.
"politicians are sensitive to voting pressures" versus
"the cat is on the mat."21

The real question is what

knowledge and information will have the most capacity for
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transfer.
Thus, McPeck believes that he has offered empirical
as well as theoretical proof that critical thinking cannot
be a generalized skill; although, with the proliferation
of transfer of training studies supporting the opposite
point of view, we need not necessarily accept this
conclusion.

What is more, by seemingly eliminating transfer

of training across disciplinary boundaries McPeck reinforces
his own assurance that the standard theorists are misguided.
The mistaken assumption, as McPeck sees it, that
critical thinking is a generalized skill has practical
consequences.

Critical thinking tests are based on this

misguided notion.
tests be.

Since the idea is false, so must the

Critical thinking as a generalized skill does

not exist but it supposedly is what is being tested for.
Since critical thinking as a generalized skill does not
exist, then critical thinking is not being tested for.
As McPeck points out in "Dangers and Dogmas," the burden
of proof traditionally rests on the person who makes an
existence claim.

Those who set up tests to measure

'critical reasoning ability' or 'general reasoning skills'
behave as if the former have actually been proven to exist.
The above mentioned tests, he claims, do two things:

(1)

they assume the phenomena being tested for are useful
to/productive of critical thinking, thereby, assuming what
needs to be proven; and (2) because abilities are
postulated, they assume the unitary underlying abilities
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exist "reifying the existence of a pervasive 'ability'
from its description."

22

(II) The Relationship Between Subject-Specificity,
Epistemology and Critical Thinking
Since we have established the link between premise
(1)

(thinking is always about something in particular)

and premise (2) (there is no generalized set of skills
called critical thinking) the next step is to establish
the link between the former premises, premise (3), critical
thinking is subject-specific, and the conclusion that
critical thinking is conceptually linked to epistemology.
The progression from premise (2) to premise (3) is a natural
one; especially given the quote on page 5 of Critical
Thinking and Education which states that "it does not make
sense to talk about critical thinking as a distinct subject
and that it therefore cannot be taught as such."

23

If

critical thinking is not a distinct subject and if it can,
nevertheless, be taught, then it must be taught as integral
to other subjects.
McPeck does not deny critical thinking involves
reasoning skills; what he denies is that critical thinking
is a skill or that there is a generalized set of skills
that can be made to be distinct from other subjects.
Insofar as critical thinking is a skill, it is teachable
as other skills are.

One thing is certain, since there

is no universally applicable skill or discipline comprising
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critical thinking, it should be taught as adjunct to other
subjects and the problems and exercises should be set up
with this in mind.
Indeed, the very idea of teaching critical
thinking in isolation from specific content
is incoherent . . . Moreover, it is crucial
to recognize that the specific ingredients
of critical thinking will differ according
to task or subject, and that it comprises
neither any specific set of skills nor
'logical' skills.
McPeck uses Toulmin to support his judgment that
critical thinking is subject-specific.

Toulmin, for

example, states that "all the canons for the criticism
and assessment of arguments, I conclude, are in practice
field-dependent, while all our terms of assessment are
field-invariant in their force."

25

From this statement and from the rest of his argument
I must conclude (with Govier) that Toulmin can be read
as supporting both sides of the dispute.

26

She cites An

Introduction to Reasoning, a book Toulmin co-authored,
which insists every argument be located in some one field
and in which he also superimposes a general account.
Subsequent reviews, she says, reveal that Toulmin has
problems fitting natural argument into one discipline
because some arguments combine themes from several
disciplines and some topics are not clearly claimed by
one discipline.

27

It would be like trying to force a square

peg into a round hole.

You would have to shave off a lot

of the peg to make it fit the hole; thereby making the
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peg into something it is not.

Attempting to put a natural

argument into one discipline when it belongs to several
also means losing much of its identity.

If Govier is right,

then Toulmin does not provide adequate support for the
view that critical thinking is subject-specific and, with
its superimposed general account, may not have intended
it to be so limited.
McPeck goes one step further by claiming that Hamblin,
whose work Fallacies Johnson and Blair, among others, claim
lays the groundwork for the development of a theory of
fallacy, actually rejects a general theory of fallacy.
According to McPeck, Hamblin supports his own claim .that
instances of fallacies or valid arguments are not
universally applicable across subject areas.

28

To

understand how the former point about informal logic relates
to critical thinking, we must realize that for McPeck
informal logic, like critical thinking, mistakenly asserts
that there are skills or criteria that cross subject or
disciplinary boundaries.

Hence, McPeck takes Hamblin's

position as not only rejecting informal logic, but also
accepting his own position on the subject-specific nature
of knowledge.
McPeck highlights three theses in Fallacies that
support his former contention.

The first is that the

foundation of fallacies rests on epistemic, not logical,
considerations (72 - 77).

The second is that when assessing

statements, acceptance, which is relative to varying
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circumstances, should take precedence over validity and
truth (242 - 245).

The third is that rules and conventions

of argument are determined by the context and belief states
of interlocutors (283 - 2 8 4 ) . ^
However, the theses do not provide the support McPeck
thinks they do.

The first thesis is unobjectionable to

informal logicians, as is the second.

McPeck's employment

of them against informal logic rests on his mistaken belief
that informal logic denigrates knowledge.

It rests on

the mistaken belief that informal logic is concerned only
with validity.

However, the third thesis is not in tune

even with McPeck who has said in his two definitions of
critical thinking, which we will examine in Section III,
that we must question belief foundations.
Ignoring the problems we have found with McPeck1s
supporters, Toulmin and Hamblin, what the argument boils
down to for McPeck is that "in general, different domains
of knowledge have (more often than not) characteristically
different patterns of reasoning and argument that are
peculiar to themselves."

30

The differences among kinds

of reasoning are greater than what is common.

An historian

argues in a way that is different from a mathematician,
an engineer, an anthropologist, etc., according to McPeck.
He uses

'mass' as an example of what he means about

differences between subjects.

The word 'mass' has different

connotations and denotations in physics and Marxist
political theory, yet it is the same word.

He claims we
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need to understand the surrounding concepts and evidence
which also "may be peculiar to that field"

31

(italics mine)

to gain an adequate understanding of, in this instance,
the word's connotations and denotations in a given field.
With premise (3) established, i.e. critical thinking
is

subject-specific, we must see how it relates to the

conclusion.

We must realize that as a philosopher of

education McPeck is concerned with how critical thinking
is to be imparted to students.

The answer to this question

resides in the conclusion to which'the premises lead;
namely, that critical thinking is conceptually linked to
epistemology.

The relation between the two not only

completes the description of critical thinking's nature,
but also tells us that to think critically in a subject
we must study the epistemology of the subject.
McPeck begins establishing this conceptual link in
Chapter Two by stating that uncritical students are not
uncritical because they suffer from a deficiency in logic,
as theorists in the standard sense of critical thinking
seem to believe, but because they lack education in the
traditional sense.

These students do not have a clear

understanding of what constitutes good reasons for belief
in the domains in which they are immersed.

An

epistemological approach provides this understanding.
"in short, there is both a conceptual and pedagogic link
between epistemology, critical thinking and education,
but the study of logic or critical thinking as such has
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29

He concludes that a person must participate in the
particular domain of inquiry to "appreciate the proper
significance of the evidence.

Indeed, the domain of inquiry

from which the evidence comes might be one in which familiar
canons of logic do not apply."

33

For example, they may

not apply in art, religion, morals, quantum physics,
economics, or law.
Some standard theorists claim that their approaches
are valuable because they teach pebple to deal with real
issues.

However, there are two reasons why standard

theorists cannot legitimately refer to their approaches'
efficacy in dealing with real issues.

First, we generally

operate in unfamiliar territory where one question generates
others, where epistemological uncertainties abound and
experts disagree.

Real issues do not depend on logical

validity, but on the truth of the premises.

"The most

striking problem with these unfamiliar realms of expertise
is that they presuppose a knowledge of technical language
and an epistemological framework that the uninitiated cannot
possess.1,34
Second, introductory logic texts claim to be most
useful in dealing with real issues in everyday life by
using editorials, letters to the editor, media accounts,
etc.

McPeck describes this approach as "superficial opinion

masquerading as profound insight into complex public
issues."

35

He stresses that exercises based upon this
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approach are contrived because all the relevant information
is given and the truth of the premises are assumed.

Things

are not that clear-cut in real life.
The main complaint McPeck directs at standard theorists
of critical thinking and informal logicians is that they
miss that real life is not clear-cut and hence they
underestimate the complexity of the different kinds of
information and overestimate the role of logic in
assessment.

In "Critical Thinking Without Logic" he states

that standard theorists treat information as if it is 'mere
information' that can be found in any encyclopedia: it
is unambiguous and uncomplicated.

P and Q function as

placeholders for statements and information which can then
be manipulated with logical rules.

"The major requirements

for such an assessment are epistemological, not logical,
in character."36
McPeck makes a good point when he suggests that we
should be wary of systems that ignore the complexity and
ambiguous nature of information and knowledge and
concentrate on the form that knowledge plugs into.

Such

a system would have limited practical use since most
information is acknowledged to be complex, often ambiguous,
and evolving.

However, I also agree with Govier who says

in her review of Critical Thinking and Education that,
"No serious logician has ever thought that logic itself
could provide all the knowledge needed to evaluate an
argument on a specific topic."

37

And so, although McPeck
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makes some good points, we need to be aware that the
criticisms he makes against the standard theorists are
not apt because he seriously misinterprets their position.
McPeck's assurance that critical thinking is
conceptually linked to epistemology is all very well, but
thus far we do not know precisely what that means because
we have no idea about what McPeck means by epistemology.
McPeck characterizes epistemology as the
Analyses of good reasons for various beliefs.
Ideally, epistemology attempts to provide
the very best reasons for holding a belief,
and to this extent its purpose is identical
with that of rationality . . . it includes
understanding concepts and the peculiarities
of the nature of evidence, as they are
understood by practitionegs in the field
from which they emanate.
We find that he adds a number of provisos to the term
'epistemology1.

First, he points out that the best reasons

need not entail logical certainty, there are other, less
stringent, criteria.

Second, and most importantly,

Just as there are different kinds of
knowledge, so there are different kinds
of reasons, evidence, and modes of justifying
them. What might be a good reason for one
kind of belief could be an extremely bad
type of^reason to support another kind of
belief.
Third, a minimal condition for understanding a good
reason in any field means understanding the full meaning
of the specialized, often technical language, in which
reasons are expressed.

Critical thinking is epistemological

in character because it is concerned with the meanings
°f statements (semantics) rather than logical relations
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"In a proposition,

for example, that is expressed as P-^Q it is far more
important and more complex to understand what P or Q mean
than to understand the syntactic relation between P and
Q (expressed by the symbol—
Finally, epistemology is concerned with gaining an
education and with gaining knowledge in various fields.
Critical thinking is conceptually linked with epistemology
therefore, "Critical thinking is a necessary condition
of education.1,42

Education entails the acquisition of

knowledge, but an analysis of knowledge shows that the
knower must be in possession of an justification of what
is putatively known.

A common criticism of schools today

is that students learn by rote acquiring facts without
•j
43
evidence.

Presumably McPeck wishes to place critical

thinking in the process of justification.
Justification, he says, has two dimensions:

(1)

assessing the veracity and internal validity of evidence
as presented, and (2) judging whether the belief with its
evidence is compatible with an existing belief system.
The process of assessing, fitting, and adjusting makes
a belief 'belong* to a person rather than it being a
proposition he has heard about.

McPeck characterizes

knowledge as,
S knows P
if and only if:
(i) S believes P,
(ii) S has adequate evidence of P,
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(iii) The evidence constitutes S's
reason for believing.P,
and (iv) P is true.
Before making a judgment about P, S must suspend his belief
about P in order to assess the internal coherence of the
evidence and to integrate P into his belief system.
But to say that a temporary suspension of judgment
is required for justifying one's beliefs is simply
another way of saying that one must be self-critical
or possess a critical mind with respect to P in order
to produce a justification.
Thus the integration
and internalization of beliefs and evidence require
critical thinking.
Moreover, critical thinking, as
I have argued, involves just such a suspension of
belief.
Critical thinking fits into steps (ii) and (iii) of McPeck's
characterization of knowledge acquisition.
No one can be 'truly educated' in McPeck's sense of
'education' without understanding the epistemology of a
subject.

To understand the epistemology of a subject,

to be educated in a subject, to have acquired knowledge
in the subject involves coming to hold the best reasons
for a belief.

Holding the best reasons for a belief, which

in turn depends on critical thinking to provide a
justification for the belief.
McPeck compares the differences between the standard
aPproach to critical thinking or education and his own
approach with comparisons to reading research between the
basic skills approach and the reading comprehension approach
m

order to clarify what is happening between the two we

a*"e interested in.

The basic skills approach "appears
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to regard reading ability as the possession of certain
46
symbolic ‘decoding and pronunciation* skills.11

It is

logically possible for someone to be a good decoder without
being able to read.

McPeck offers the example of an

individual who speaks English and who has learned to
recognize and pronounce written German.

That person

successfully decodes the text, but we would not claim he
is reading because he received no message from the symbols.
He does not understand what the symbols mean.
In the comprehension approach

"the cognitive

prerequisites for reading comprehension are fundamental
to the reading process, and, since comprehension involves
understanding information, concepts, and various
implications of these, the 'basic skills* view is overly
simplistic.
An examination of the research on critical thinking
indicates to McPeck that it suffers from the same ailment
as research on reading.
Critical thinking, after all, likewise
entails the appropriate processing of
information and the making of inferences
with respect to that information, but as
with reading comprehension, critical thinking
cannot be reduced to a few mechanical
'decoding* skills.
We become mired in what McPeck calls in "Is Reading," the
process/content debate, i.e. are the necessary competencies
generalizable skills or acquired information?

By bringing

reading into McPeck*s favourite issue we can easily guess
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Process always takes a backseat to

content.
Critical thinking, like reading, depends on
understanding.

McPeck1s epistemological approach to

critical thinking succeeds, in his estimation, because
it alone provides the understanding necessary to think
critically about anything.

With the link between critical

thinking and epistemology established, we will look to
the definitions which gain their mandate from the above
argument.
(Ill) McPeck1s Definitions of Critical Thinking
We have examined the basic premises McPeck rests his
conception of critical thinking on.

We shall now look

at the two definitions of critical thinking that arise
from these premises.

These definitions do not depend upon

the features and nature of critical thinking for their
content.

The link between critical thinking and

epistemology does not affect the definitions.
of fact the first definition,

As a matter

"the propensity and skill

to engage in an activity with reflective skepticism,
is not very different
attributed to Ennis.

.49

from the definition commonly
Ennis claims critical thinking is

"reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding
what to believe or do."*^

Both connect critical thinking

with some form of reflective thinking and both focus on
a process ('engaging in' and 'deciding').

On the face
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of it neither definition is inherently superior to the
other; however, we need to see that the definitions McPeck
offers do not differentiate his conception of critical
thinking from an acceptable standard approach version.
The difference between McPeck and the standard approach
is the argument outlined in Sections I and II which says
critical thinking is subject-specific and conceptually
linked to epistemology.
The two approaches are differentiated by the conceptual
assumptions (as seen in Sections I and II) that they rest
on.

McPeck1s definition, for example, functions within

specific subjects rather than across them.

To have' the

'skill' he refers to, a person would have to be immersed
in the subject to know what 'skill(s)1 to bring to bear
on a problem.

Which 'skill(s)1 remain undefined, because

different subjects and different problems will require
different skills.
The types of skill to which I am drawing attention
are those that have identifiable intellectual
components, such as the use or partial use of
various methods (research methods, statistical
methods, programming methods), strategies (for
solving problems, winning battles or games,
attacking mountains) and techniques
(crystallography versus spectrometry,) models
versus pictures, telling versus showing . . .
Not all skills permit the use of critical
thinking.
Unfortunately, this necessary vagueness in identifying
critical skills causes problems.

McPeck has not provided

any criteria to decide which critical thinking skills to
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Perhaps it would take critical thinking skills to

tell which critical thinking skills are necessary in any
given situation, and that would lead us to believe the
critical thinker would already know what they are.

Perhaps

we could look at an activity and say "Those are critical
thinking skills"; or more than likely for McPeck, which
skills are used would depend on the circumstances, and
that again amounts to the original conjecture that we ought
to know what they are.
As I said, because critical thinking is
subject-specific what comprises critical thinking skills
necessarily remains undefined.

What is considered '

'critical1 in one subject may not be so in another subject.
What is critical in one subject is not necessarily critical
in another.

Realizing this, however, does not invalidate

my concern that McPeck gives us no way to identify which
skills count as critical at any ..particular place and time.
The definition is meant to facilitate the use of the
conception, to specifically detail what critical thinking
is and direct us in using it; however, because the
definition does not supply this identification, McPeck's
conception— at least, so defined— is unworkable.

This

lack is of major concern since critical thinking is meant
to be instrumental.

If we cannot identify what critical

skills are required at any given time and if we are not
provided with a way to decide, then the conception McPeck
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offers lacks instrumentality.

This failure only voids

the definition; it does not affect the conception itself.
The use of 'propensity' in the definition refers to
the attitudes, habits of mind, or character traits (although
McPeck does not like this last term) of a critical thinker
as opposed to critical thinking itself.

However, apart

from saying teachers must inculcate this undefined
propensity in their students, McPeck does not describe
what 'propensity* entails.

All we are told is that both

propensity and skill are necessary for a critical thinker.
If the propensity carries over to an area where an
individual lacks skill, then it is likely to be
embarrassing

52

because he does not have the relevant

knowledge to satisfy his proclivities.

It would be like

the comic Norm Crosby who uses large words in places and
ways they do not belong.

He has the propensity, lacks

the skill, and gets a laugh.

That kind of mistake in 'real

life' would prove to be embarrassing and indicate a lack
of success.
The term "reflective skepticism" is unclear.

Under

normal conditions we might be able to say what the
individual words mean, but McPeck coins his own
interpretation.

For him 'skepticism' refers to a healthy

advance towards the resolution of a problem.

"Skepticism

or suspension of assent towards a given statement,
established norm or mode of doing things"

53

allows for
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alternative hypotheses and possibilities.

McPeck's

characterization rules out the negative baggage that
traditionally accompanies 'skepticism' which has a
connotation of doubting for doubt's sake.

McPeck, however,

states that his type of 'skepticism' does not allow
pervasive or unjustified questioning.

'Reflection' comes

into play when a critical thinker attempts to determine
when to bring his skills to bear and what to ask.
Prom the above explanations he concludes that "no
one can think critically about everything, as there are
no Renaissance men in this age of specialized knowledge."

54

Renaissance men apparently knew a great deal about a lot,
and this is no longer possible.

Subjects today are too

complex for us to become as well-rounded as Renaissance
men.
Apart from the above considerations regarding the
terms and stipulations McPeck employs, a number of people
have expressed other concerns regarding McPeck's first
definition.

In Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical

Thinking and Education, Siegel exposes a problem in the
alliance between reflective skepticism and critical
thinking.

He charges that the term "reflective skepticism"

is unhelpful and the definition is circular.

A skeptic

could be reflective and the skepticism unjustified;
alternatively, someone could be skeptical and not
reflective.55
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I think it is important to point out that Siegel's
criticism thus far does not carry much weight, because
he ignores the fact that McPeck stipulated what he means
by 'skepticism'.

As we have seen, McPeck's version does

not allow for unjustified skepticism.

The norms of the

subject area determine when we should start questioning,
i.e. what we should question, and why we should question
it.

Our skepticism would always be justified.

Moreover,

McPeck might also reply that someone might be reflective
and unskeptical but that this would mean, by his definition,
that that person is not a critical thinker.
thinker is both reflective and skeptical.

A critical
To be reflective

without being skeptical or to be skeptical without being
reflective means that that person does not meet the
conditions of a critical thinker.
Siegel continues by saying that the question could
not be settled by appropriateness, which is determined
by the criteria of the problem area, because often we are
to be reflectively skeptical about the criteria.

We would

need to use critical thinking to determine if an instance
of reflective skepticism is justified.

"Hence justified

reflective skepticism assumes critical thinking;
consequently, it cannot in turn explicate or define critical
thinking."56
This last criticism is similar to the one I presented
about needing critical thinking skills to determine which
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critical thinking skills to bring to bear on a problem
(p. 36 - 37).

We are caught in an infinite loop.

Critical

skills are necessary to decide when and what critical skills
to bring to bear on a problem; yet, we do not know how
to acquire the first set of skills in order to decide on
the second set.

Reflective skepticism assumes critical

thinking, so we cannot use reflective skepticism to explain
critical thinking.

Both, to use an informal logic fallacy,

improperly beg the question.
Siegel seems to be saying that critical thinking is
needed to determine when critical thinking is needed to
determine when critical thinking is needed, and thatreferring to the norms of a subject area will not work
because sometimes the norms are the very things that need
to be questioned.

This suggestion sounds solid and

attractive; however, for McPeck, critical thinking is
brought to bear when rational thinking fails.

57

That is

to say, when we hit a problematic juncture in our reasoning,
then critical thinking would be brought to bear on that
problematic juncture (and I imagine that we supposedly
know when that happened whether it occurred in the course
of normal reasoning in the subject area or when the norms
failed).
This suggestion also sounds good.

It would sound

better if McPeck had not stressed, in both his discussion
°f rationality and in his discussion of reflective

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
skepticism, that referring to the norms of the subject
area is essential to determine when to use judicious

i i.• •
58
skepticism.
I can understand why Siegel has a problem with McPeck1
definition.

Assessing the norms or standards of a subject

area is certainly important.

Critical thinking would be

of little use if it could not question the norms in use
in any subject.

Were that the case, where would the

advances in science, history, et. al. come from if the
norms in the field could not be questioned, let alone
altered?

Yet I wonder what an acceptable definition of

critical thinking would look like if it includes using
the norms of a subject as well as questioning those same
norms.

Some outside criteria would need to be applied

to determine when it is reasonable simply to use the given
norms and when to question those same norms.

It begins

to sound as if McPeck's opponents are correct in claiming
that critical thinking is a subject unto itself.

Thought

°f in this way, the standards of critical thinking would
answer these difficult questions.

That way critical

thinking would not be embedded in the very norms it was
meant to question.
Frederick Oscanyan and Perry Weddle individually focus
on the question whether it is reasonable or not to connect
critical and reflective thinking.

Oscanyan highlights

the difference, as he sees it, between the two, and thus,
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his criticism can be directed against Ennis as well.

Weddle

pinpoints trouble surrounding "reflective skepticism" when
put into practice.

I will look first at Oscanyan, then

Weddle.
In "Critical Thinking in California: Response to Brooke
Moore" Oscanyan states:
Reflective thinking differs from critical thinking
in its appreciation of the variety of mental
acts and styles of thought, its sense of when
criteria for evaluating mental acts are needed,
and its willingness to suspect that criteria
for evaluating mental acts are needed, and its
willingness to suspect that the criteria it has
got are not the only ones there can be.
„
Reflective thinking is thinking about thinking.
Apart from its limitation to mental acts, I cannot discern
a real conflict between reflective thinking and the way
McPeck wants critical thinking to work.

Add 'activities'

to 'mental acts' and the two types of thinking would seem
to be indistinguishable.
Whether Oscanyan's characterization of reflective
thinking is correct or not, he is right in mentioning that
there is presumably a difference between reflective thinking
and critical thinking.

If all we wanted were reflective

thinkers, then why not say so instead of arguing for years
about critical thinkers and critical thinking?

According

to Ennis critical thinking is "reasonable reflective
thinking."

According to McPeck critical thinking is

"engaging in an activity with reflective skepticism" where
the meaning of 'skepticism' is so stipulated as to remove
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If so many people agree critical

thinking is reflective thinking then the answer as to what
constitutes critical thinking was there all the time.
And yet upon reflection, there is the sense that
reflective thinking and critical thinking are two different,
yet closely related, types of thinking.

By defining

critical thinking as reflective thinking as Ennis does,
we lose the force of ’critical1 and end up defining an
undefined term by referring to yet another undefined term
- "reflective thinking."
McPeck’s definition is in a stronger position than
Ennis1s because he allies critical thinking with reflective
skepticism.

This alliance provides for the reflective

aspect of critical thinking each theorist believes is
necessary and provides for the critical aspect by fusing
reflection with skepticism.

This fusion takes McPeck1s

definition beyond Ennisfs because (1) the critical,
questioning aspect of critical thinking is provided for,
and (2) critical thinking becomes other than just another
name for reflective thinking.
Weddle in "McPeck^ Critical Thinking and Education",
however, is not convinced that thinking critically about
something is the same as thinking about it with reflective
skepticism.

Since thinking and critical thinking are about

the skepticism would be aimed at some X.

What, he asks,

would that X be, the activity itself or the manner of
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Using poker as an example, Weddle claims that

it takes brains and guile to win at poker just as it does
with chess.

However, you are not reflectively skeptical

about poker, you are playing it; therefore, X must refer
to the manner of engagement.

60

A careful reading of the

text would have shown Weddle the question was a moot one
since McPeck makes it quite clear in Chapter One of Critical
Thinking and Education that critical thinking concerns
the process of thinking not the outcome of it.

Be that

as it may, Weddle sees poker's manner of engagement as
being critical, but not reflectively skeptical.

As he

sees it, rational players who are reflectively skeptical
about the minutiae of the game do not engage in an activity
- they cash in their chips. 61
I do not understand why Weddle believes we can engage
critically in playing poker, but that we can not do so
with reflective skepticism.
criticism.

He never clarifies his

Clearly he believes playing poker involves

thinking, since it takes "brains and guile" to win, so
why would it not be possible to play poker with reflective
skepticism?

Part of the problem is his belief that

reflective skepticism bogs you down in minutiae.

He seems

to believe that a player will be so busy thinking and
questioning and creating alternate possibilities that he
will become fossilized.

This belief is false and depends

either on a misreading of McPeck or on a lack of careful
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McPeck clearly states that his definition does

not allow for pervasive or unjustified questioning.
'Pervasive1 is the operative word here.

62

Dredging up

minutiae would not be utilizing reflective skepticism.
Apart from McPeck's not providing a way to determine
when to question the norms of a subject and the vagueness
of the terms in his definition, the criticisms leveled
against it are not telling ones.

However, McPeck gives

a second more formal definition.

It sets out a problem

(X), the evidence for the problem area (E), and the
proposition or action in X (P).
Then we can say of a given student (S) that
he is a critical thinker in area X if S
has the disposition and skill to do X in
such a way that E, or some subset of E,
is suspended as being sufficient to establish
the truth or viability of P.
Note that this definition shares a reliance on disposition
or propensity and skill with the first definition.

You

do not have one without the other.
Oddly enough, after all the commentary directed at
McPeck's "reflective skepticism" definition, only Siegel
addresses this more formal definition.
the material I have unearthed.)

(At least in all

In "McPeck, Informal Logic

and the Nature of Critical Thinking," for instance, Siegel
asserts that McPeck, in his formal definition, is correct
about "the act of suspension."

64

However, while conferring

praise on McPeck for this, Siegel continues by claiming
that McPeck loses sight of this important point by grinding
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his "subject specific" axe into the ground.
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Furthermore, Siegel praises McPeck because he notices
the two necessary components of critical thinking - the
reason assessment component and the critical attitude
(willingness/desire to base actions on reasons).

Both

components are necessary, but jointly they are sufficient
for critical thinking.

66

"To have the disposition and

skill . . ." is to ask whether E provides compelling reasons
for P.
This is, I think, the defining characteristic
of critical thinking: the focus on reasons
and the power of reasons to warrant or
justify beliefs, claims, and actions.
A
critical thinker, then is one who is
appropriately moved by reasons: she has
the propensity or disposition to believe
and act in accordance with reasons, and
she has the ability to assess the force
of reasons in the man^ contexts in which
reasons play a role.
Siegel calls this the 'reasons1 conception.
Apart from these comments by Siegel on McPeck's second,
formal definition, which do not damn the definition itself,
it has gone largely unremarked.

Perhaps theorists have

become so enamoured with his first definition that they
do not even notice the second; perhaps they feel that the
two are related and by undermining the first, they
automatically undermine the second.

My point is that this

definition is neglected in the literature.

Since the

criticisms leveled at the first definition bombard the
phrase "reflective skepticism", they have no effect on
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the second definition which does not mention it.

If taking

aim at subject-specificity is supposed to deal a knock-out
blow to the second definition, the critics would have to
specifically point out how this works - and they do not.
If they agree with it, it would be nice to know.
The definitions we have just been exploring work within
the mandate of the argument outlined in Sections I and
II.

They also work within the limits outlined in McPeck's

ten features.

This being the case, we will examine the

features next.
(I V )

The Features of Critical Thinking

With the definitions brought into the open, we will
now look at the ten features of critical thinking scattered
throughout Critical Thinking and Education.
set the limits for the above definitions.

These features

They indicate

how the definitions must operate for thinking to be critical
and indicate how they do not operate.

However, it is

imperative that we realize that these features are very
broad.

They do not, for example, give us a way to tell

which critical skills to bring to bear on a problem.

Some

he states openly, others need to be extracted.
Nevertheless, these features indicate, in general terms,
what critical thinking does and does not include, its place
among other intellectual activities, and how it manifests
itself.
(1) Critical Thinking and Non-propositional Logic
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In his critique of Robert Ennis's first attempt at
defining critical thinking, i.e. "the correct assessing
68
of statements,11
McPeck argues that that definition is
too narrow.
any activity requiring deliberation is
capable of employing critical thinking,
and that it is not restricted to
propositional knowledge.
In addition, there are many activities (for
example, mountain climbing) and skills
(chess, competitive wrestling and so one)
that permit critical thought but do not
necessarily ^gvolve the 'assessment of
statements.'
Thus critical thinking can be manifested in as many
ways as there are types of activities that can be thought
critically about - and these are innumerable.

These

activities can include acts of physical strength, dexterity,
and the assessment of statements of some kind.

Given the

large number of activities, it is likely that there is
a correspondingly large number of criteria for its correct
application.

"In this sense the phrase 'critical thinking'

functions like the term 'creative': actions that deserve
the epithet vary widely, but the intended meaning is
constantly identifiable."

71

Critical thinking not only

affects activities involving deliberation, but its nature
and criteria alter with the nature of the activity.
From the above it is clear that non-propositional
knowledge must play a large role in critical thinking.
However, McPeck does not develop this side of critical
thinking anymore than Ennis does.

In fact McPeck limits
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the discussion to the assessment of statements and
propositional knowledge since that "is the prime area of
interest in academic subjects."

72

I have seen no examples

in any of the literature of the development of his theory
when applied to "decisions, skills, methods, and
techniques."

73

Since his concept of critical thinking

involves more than the artificial boundaries set up in
Chapter Two and in his book, I can only wonder how McPeck
sees it working for non-propositional knowledge.
(2) Critical Thinking is Voluntary and Directed
Critical thinking is voluntary and directed.
order

74

In

to think critically we must be consciously addressing

some issue or problem, and we must decide to do so.
Sometimes thoughts will seem to come upon us unexpectedly
or uninvitedly; for instance, when we gaze at cloud
formations and suddenly 'see' a horse's head in a cloud.
Looking at the cloud is voluntary; however, the image of
the horse's head popped in without being consciously
thought.

Imagination, which McPeck states is another

description of how we t h i n k , ^ often works that way.

To

be an instance of critical thinking, we must not only want
to and decide to think critically about something, we must
also direct our thought processes.

Knowing the problem

and knowing what is being sought and why, the critical
thinker follows the paths- he needs to satisfy his purpose
in thinking critically about it.
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(3) Critical Thinking is a Task and Achievement Concept
Critical thinking is a task and an achievement
concept.

76

When we talk about a task concept as opposed

to an achievement concept, our concern is with the means
of acquiring something rather than with the desired end.
An achievement concept focuses on the end achieved rather
than the process used to reach it.

Machiavelli's political

theory, for example, can best be described as an achievement
concept.

Gaining and holding power, the end, justifies

any actions, however unethical and brutal, to acquire it.
According to McPeck, critical thinking is concerned'with
both how we achieve an end and the achievement itself.
A task concept focuses on the process used to achieve an
end.

The concern is with how the end is reached, not with

whether or not the 'correct1 answer is achieved nor with
always reaching a resolution.
in critical thinking.
degrees of efficacy.

Thus, there can be errors

Skills can be used with varying
The definitions indicated that

critical thinking depends on using critical skills, so
it makes sense that critical thinking is a task concept.
However, McPeck1s brief explanation suggests that
critical thinking is a task but not an achievement concept.
When solving a problem we cannot tell from the solution
if it was reached critically, only the process used to
reach it can be described this way.

Furthermore, McPeck
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tells us, even if the process (the task) is performed
critically there is no guarantee we will reach a solution
or that the solution will work.

77

In other words, there

is no guarantee of attaining an achievement.

Despite his

claiming critical thinking is both a task and achievement
concept, his argument supports critical thinking as a task
and not an achievement concept unless he conceives of
'achievement' in another way.
Note: features (4) and (5) lend support to this
conclusion, as we shall see, since they depend upon there
not being a 'right' or 'correct' answer and upon some people
being more critical than others.

Focusing on 'achievement'

can mean assuming some of the difficulties attendant with
'correctness', because achievement focuses on the end
achieved.

'Achievement' can be read as wanting the

'correct' solution.

To defuse this situation McPeck needs

to clarify what he means by 'achievement'

and how it

relates to 'task', and to couch his supporting argument
in such terms that defend critical thinking as both, not
just as a task concept.
(4) Critical Thinking Involves Degrees of Skill
The skills necessary for critical thinking admit of

degrees.

7 ft

Some people will have a greater grasp of the

skills involved than others will, because skills are born
of knowledge and experience in specific areas, and everyone
has a unique history.

Since critical thinking is concerned
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with the means, not the end to a problem, success cannot
always be guaranteed or expected.

79

This feature is closely

related to feature three, but it is concerned more with
the background a critical thinker brings to bear on the
process than on the process itself.
(5) Critical Thinking and 'Correctness'
The fifth boundary can be extracted from (1), (3),
and (4), and that is that the notion of 'correctness' is
inappropriate to the concept of critical thinking.

There

are two ways of understanding 'correct' when it is applied
to critical thinking.

It can stand for right (versus

wrong), or it can stand for some appropriate procedure
being followed.
When 'correct' functions as 'being right', it advances
"a

formal or absolute notion of critical thinking that

permits of neither degrees nor mistakes."
out both the third and fourth features.

80

Thus, it rules

The third is ruled

out because by focusing on whether an answer is 'right
or wrong', we ignore the possibility that a solution may
not have been reached critically, and by thus focusing
on 'achievement', the 'task' facet is ignored.

An absolute

notion of being correct does not permit degrees or mistakes;
thus, the fourth feature is ruled out.

Since the argument

McPeck offers for the third tells us that critical thinking
focuses on process rather'than on outcome, there can be
degrees of skill and mistakes made in reaching a goal.
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McPeck believes that Ennis missed the fact that thinking
critically is a function of how a particular result is
pursued not with what the result is.

"Just as rationality

is a function not of what is believed but of the way in
which a belief is arrived at, so too with critical with
critical thinking."81
McPeck should agree that a person can correctly follow
a process even if the goal sought is never reached.

For

instance, if the goal is to solve a problem critically,
then, broadly speaking, according to his definition, the
correct procedure would be to bring reflective skepticism
to bear.

How well you use this procedure to a great extent

depends upon how much practice you have had.

The fact

remains that 'correctness1, as McPeck initially conceived
it, has no place in critical thinking, and he was right
to overtly exclude it.
(6) Critical Thinking and Rationality
Critical thinking is not equivalent to rationality

or reasoning in general; it is a subset of it.

82

McPeck

does not develop what rationality is, since he considers
the concept to be too complex to be dealt with.88

For

this discussion he provisionally describes rationality
as an "intelligent use of all available evidence for the
solution of some problem."8^
Critical thinking makes itself useful and gains
conceptual content when we hit a problematic juncture in
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reasoning, when we must say, "what counts as evidence?"
"The concept of critical thinking merely marks out the
facet of rationality that comprises the disposition, and
skill to find such difficulties in the normal course of

OC
reasoning."

McPeck admits that this is not a full

analysis, but believes it goes some way in clarifying a
lot of the confusion and disagreement surrounding critical
thinking and its relation to education.
I am afraid that I cannot agree with this last
statement, which seems to me to be overly optimistic.
McPeck recognizes that a problem exists in discussions
°f critical thinking and informal logic due to the use
of opaque, yet related terms like 'rationality1,
'reasoning',

'problem solving',

'intelligence',

'decision

making'f 'thinking', etc. - i.e. what has been referred
.
86
to as the Network Problem.
I would like to commend him
for realizing there are differences and for attempting
to deal with the difference between critical thinking and
nationality even in some small fashion.

However, even

granting that he is not giving a detailed analysis, I
believe we need either to hear more on the relation between
rationality and critical thinking or to hear something
a little different, to see that this analysis is even
warranted.

At this juncture in his analysis, this

discussion's inclusion is unnecessary and clouds the issue.
For instance, we should know why critical thinking
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is needed at McPeck's problematic junctures and what it
brings to bear upon such a juncture that rationality itself
cannot.

As matters stand, critical thinking and rationality

seem to be the same thing since critical thinking, like
rationality, is concerned with using evidence to solve
problems.

87

Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that

rationality involves "the intelligent use of all available
evidence" (italics mine).

88

What constitutes "intelligent

use" and would we not prefer critical thinking to be done
intelligently?

The difference between the two remains

unclear.
(7)

Critical Thinking and Creative Thinking

Despite arguments early in Chapter One, McPeck
implicitly links creative and critical thinking.

In those

early arguments (pp. 4 - 5), where McPeck tries to
illustrate why critical thinking is mistakenly reified
into a curriculum subject, he suggests that this reification
occurs because of the emphasis on 'critical' as if critical
thinking alters the nature and operation of thinking.
However,

'critical' behaves like 'precocious,1

'imaginative',

'sensitive', and 'creative1, which qualify

thinking and which, in themselves, do not describe what
Q Q

is being thought about.

"Adding the adjective 'critical'

to the phrase 'thinking about X' describes in some general
way how something is thought about, but it does not describe
that something.
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'critical' and 'creative' are two different

types of thinking.

He describes

'creative' as being

something usually novel and aesthetically appealing while
'critical' could be, but does not always, function in
conjunction with it.

91

However, no matter what his early explanations lead
us to believe about the relationship between 'creative'
and 'critical' thinking, he clearly believes the two are
in some way connected.

When he argues that logic is of

limited value to critical thinking he concludes that
Logic can help to eliminate hypotheses,
conjectures, and plausible solutions, but
it cannot provide them.
In the most common
problem solving situations within disciplines
and working fields of knowledge, the most
difficult - and perhaps most important phase is that of producing a hypothesis,
conjecture, or alternative that is worth
checking or trying out.
He clearly implies that generating hypotheses and
alternatives are important for critical thinking; however,
providing such hypotheses, especially when alternative
standards are sought,

is a function of creativity.

Thus

McPeck implicitly links creative with critical thinking.
McPeck would have been better off by explicitly drawing
out this link.

Without it critical thinking is hopelessly

stunted, lacking its hypothesis-building component.

As

Micheal Scriven notes, and as McPeck himself would agree,
'critical' alone is negative.

It must be constructive

and creative to lead to new knowledge.

Thinking of
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alternative hypotheses is a creative act; moreover,
creativity is useless without critical skills since,
presumably, it takes critical thinking to know where
creativity ought to be applied.

93

Ennis states that "This

conception (of rational thinking) combines creative
thinking, critical thinking, and problem solving - all
skills that are thoroughly interdependent in practice."
(8)

94

Critical Thinking and Problem Solving

From the quote on the limitations of logic on critical
thinking, McPeck concludes that the prescriptions logic
can make are so general and so obvious as to be virtually
useless in problem solving.^

I am concerned with McPeck's

alliance of critical thinking and problem solving.

The

above sentence typifies the identification which McPeck
makes throughout Critical Thinking and Education and
throughout his articles on the subject.
The link is also in evidence in several places (pages
9/ 15, 16, and 17) in just the first chapter of his book
and this list is by no means exhaustive.
appears in "Trivial Pursuit."

A good example

"Critical thinking ability

• • . varies directly with the amount of knowledge required
by the problem."^6

He uses J.P. Guilford in "The Evaluation

of Critical Thinking Programs: Dangers and Dogmas" to
support his contention about the non-generalizability of
skills, and it also supports his alignment of critical
thinking with problem solving.

"'Problems are simply too
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varied, and each type seems to call upon its own pattern
of abilities.'"^7
This identification of critical thinking with problem
solving is yet another aspect of the Network Problem.
Problem solving often involves critical thinking.

However,

I am not prepared to agree that all problem solving needs
to utilize critical thinking to derive a solution.

Deciding

which is the most efficacious route to reach a mountain
summit is a problem, but as I will argue in the last
chapter, it is not a case for critical thinking.
Alternately, not all critical thinking revolves around
a problem to be solved.

As Jonathan Adler points out,

we can engage in critical thinking simply out of
intellectual curiousity.

98

It is not the case that

something needs to be amiss.
Critical thinking might be equated with problem solving
if it were stipulated that a 'problem' consists of any
situation where we must choose one facet from many available
ones.

However, I believe that would mean expanding the

nature of what constitutes a problem far beyond what is
normally meant by the word.

It would be stipulating the

meaning of 'problem' just to fit McPeck's concept of
critical thinking.
(9)Critical Thinking and the Exclusion of Value Judgments
In Chapter Three McPeck uses Ennis, once again, as
a jumping off point to establish another feature of critical
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He sees the most serious limitation of Ennis's

list of critical thinking skills and attitudes as its
exclusion of value judgments.

For McPeck, and this is

a crucial thing to realize, critical thinking is full of
value judgments.
As he points out, any decision about how much evidence
is enough is a direct function of how important it is that
a statement be right or wrong.

A determination of what

is more important depends upon assessing each piece of
evidence in terms of the relative value placed on them.
"A person's values are an integral feature of rational
judgment, and the pragmatic dimension (in Ennis's theory)
properly serves to underline this fact."
The inclusion of 'value judgments'

99
in this list of

features of critical thinking is something of a chimera.
What people typically mean, and what Ennis means, by 'value
judgment'

is prescribing a judgment, such as good, evil,

right, wrong, beautiful, or ugly to certain things, actions,
and entities.
judgment.

The statement "abortion is wrong" is a value

It is also a good example of why Ennis does

not wish to include value judgments in the early stages
of learning how to think critically.

Many issues revolving

around 'value judgments' are contentious and more likely
to cloud the discussion and retard the assimilation of
critical thinking skills and dispositions than clarify
them.

Students can become so engrossed in arguing their
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own points of view that they miss the material that they
are supposed to be learning.
When 'value judgments' are understood this way I am
certain that McPeck would agree that they ought not to
be included when the criteria of critical thinking are
first being broached -even if they are being broached in
specific subjects.

To include them would only confuse

those students who are attempting to gain a minimal
understanding of the subject and who are not yet able to
operate as successful critical thinkers.

When McPeck

discusses critical thinking tests in Chapter Six of his
book, he makes it clear that he is aware of the problems
attendant with the inclusion of 'value judgments'.

He

points out that many questions in such tests are meant
to be done without allowing personal attitudes and values
to interfere.

However, the questions depend on a

person's political views.

"What one considers important,

which is one of the requirements of 'strong' argument is
similarly determined by one's value orientation."

1 01

McPeck

thinks, and I agree, that the correct response would be
to attack the inadequacy of the questions, but that option
is not available.

The point is, McPeck recognizes the

trouble that value judgments can cause and, in critical
thinking tests, for example, he would prefer to point out
that that is a problem rather than still use the faulty
questions.
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Taking McPeck's awareness of the problems with
including 'value judgments' in critical thinking, we have
to wonder why he berates Ennis for excluding them and for
insisting that value judgments belong in critical thinking.
The reason is that when McPeck aligns himself against Ennis
he is unaware that he and Ennis are talking about two
different and compatible things.

Ennis, as we have seen,

is talking about the difficulty of assessing value
judgments.

In his reply to Ennis, McPeck insists that

assessing reasoning is an activity which belongs to the
class, evaluating.
involves

By asserting that critical thinking

'evaluating' McPeck believes that he is denying

Ennis's proposition that 'value judgments' need to withheld
from critical thinking at this point.
McPeck is mistaken.

Clearly, Ennis is not denying

that critical thinking involves evaluating.

I am sure

that he would agree that determining whether one piece
of evidence for a belief is more important than another
piece of evidence depends on assessing each piece of
evidence in terms of the relative value placed on them.
'Value judgments', however, are a class of things that
must be evaluated; therefore, Ennis's proposition and
McPeck's proposition are not incompatible.
wishes to remove 'value judgments'

Ennis merely

from McPeck's evaluation

process at this time.
I stated earlier in the discussion of 'value judgments
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that including 'value judgments'
features is a chimera.

in McPeck's list of

I said this because McPeck's

inclusion of 'value judgments' was not quite what it
appeared to be on the surface.

To say that critical

thinking needs to include evaluating, which is what McPeck
wants, is not as profound and as arguable as saying that
'value judgments', in Ennis's sense, ought to be included
in critical thinking since I can think of no one who would
deny critical thinking involves evaluating and many who
would agree withholding 'value judgments' would do no harm.
(10) Critical Thinking and Logic
The final feature of critical thinking is one of
omission rather than addition.

Throughout Critical Thinking

and Education and the various journal articles, McPeck
has made it quite clear that critical thinking cannot be
equated to logic - either formal or informal.

Chapter

Four of his book deals specifically with the inadequacy

of informal logic to meet the needs of critical thinking.
Among other things he argues that people can be

critical thinkers and not informal logicians,

102

there

is no difference between informal logic and rhetoric,

1 03

informal logic devalues the complex and ambiguous nature

of knowledge,1*^4 and that informal logic is concerned with
validity rather than truth and answers to problems.

1 05

I will not address the soundness of the above arguments
because they could encompass a chapter all by themselves.
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Suffice it to say there are strong arguments advanced
against each of his main premises and his overall conclusion
that informal logic and critical thinking do not belong
together.

I will say that in my opinion his analysis of

informal logic fails primarily because he misinterprets
the nature and conditions of informal logic.
I admit that this claim requires defense.

However,

What we must

understand, at this point, is that McPeck sees critical
thinking and logic - formal and informal - as two very
different things.
(V) Summary
The title of this chapter, The Meaning of Critical
Thinking, is taken from the first chapter of Critical
Thinking and Education.

McPeck wants to provide the first

thorough analysis of the concept of critical thinking and
he devotes the first two chapters to this analysis.
The important point for us to see in his analysis
is the conceptual link he makes between critical thinking
and epistemology.

All of McPeck's arguments on critical

thinking, whether they be about the failure of informal
logic theory or of critical thinking, revolve around this
point.

it is imperative that we understand that McPeck

reached this position due to some very basic assumptions;
namely,

(1) thinking is always about some X, (2) there

is no set of generalized skills called critical thinking,
an<i (3) critical thinking, therefore, is subject-specific.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER THREE
THE ANALYSIS OF MCPEC K'S CONCEPTION OF CRITICAL THINKING

. . . because collective human experience has
discovered that different kinds of beliefs often
have different kinds of good reason supporting
them, it follows that there will be many different
epistemologies corresponding to different fields
of human endeavour.
A corollary of this is that
logic itself is parasitic upon epistemology,
since logic is merely the formalization of good
reasons once they have been discovered.
Thus
epistemology, and to some extent logic, have
intra-field validity but not necessarily
inter-field validity.
The above quote appears in Chapter Seven of Critical
Thinking and Education and embodies much of what is wrong
with M cPeck1s conception of critical thinking.

Here, for

instance, we see him explicitly apportioning epistemology
into separate epistemologies which, as we shall see, Siegel
cites as a major difficulty with McPeck1s position.
However, Siegel did not follow his criticism to its logical
conclusion.

I will do just that, arguing that the same

reasoning has the upshot that there are as many different
concepts of critical thinking as there are fields of human
endeavour.
As we shall see, the arguments McPeck used to support
his three premises and his conclusion about the nature
and operation of critical thinking lead to the above
67
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of the concepts he uses allows undermining of his theory
of critical thinking to be undermined.
From the above sorts of considerations, I will conclude
that McPeck's concept of critical thinking fails because
(1) the vagueness of the related concepts that he uses
to define critical thinking lead to an ill-defined concept
of critical thinking, and (2) the arguments establishing
the concept of critical thinking, as well as establishing
the network terms, lead to the conclusion that there is
no concept of critical thinking.

His analysis argues the

object of that analysis into non-existence.

The arguments

mentioned in (2) make (1) possible because it is (2)'s
arguments that link the network terms together making
critical thinking vulnerable.
We will examine many of these related terms in the
following Sections.

In our exploration we will see how

closely these terms become connected, why they turn out
to be subject-specific (even where McPeck would not find
it desirable), and finally how the combination of being
ill-defined and subject-specific topples McPeck's conception
of critical thinking.

We will start with 'subject', since,

if virtually everything turns out to be subject-specific,
it is necessary to know what a subject is.

We will move

on to 'reasons' which support our knowing 'subjects', to
the overt relationships between critical thinking,
epistemology, and rationality, and to the relationships
between critical thinking, argument analysis, and informal
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Finally, we will see how the relationships outlined

in the preceding Sections lead to the failure of McPeck's
concept of critical thinking.
(I) Subjects, Fields, Domains, and Disciplines
Before I demonstrate the vagueness of terms like
'rationality',

'critical thinking',

'epistemology', and

'argument'; before presenting Siegel's argument against
McPeck's theory of epistemology; and before explaining
specifically how his concept of critical thinking shatters,I
will examine the nature of a term- which plays a central
role in McPeck's theory:

'subject'.

This discussion belongs

here rather than in Chapter Two because first in Chapter
Two my main concern was with illustrating the arguments
that led to the conclusion that critical thinking is
subject-specific, and any exploration of the nature of
'subject' would have confused matters, and second the nature
of 'subject', like the nature of 'rationality' and 'critical
thinking' is vague.
My first concern revolves around an issue of
clarification.

In the critical thinking literature we

often see subject-specificity used interchangeably with
field, domain, and discipline-specificity;^ however, all
four terms remain vague.
see that he .has a problem.

McPeck, unfortunately, does not
He says that

One of the strengths of the present analysis
is that while it recognizes that critical thinking
is connected logically with specific tasks or
subject matter, it places no a priori restriction
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on what that subject matter might be.
On the face of it, McPeck has a good case.

5
'Subject' is

vague, because it is meant to be in order to prevent
critical thinking from being too narrowly limited.

However

we now have no idea what critical skills to bring to bear
on a problem since critical skills depend on the subject,
and as I shall shortly argue, we have no way of telling
what constitutes a subject.

In Chapter Two, I argued that

McPeck gave us no mechanism for deciding what critical
skills are necessary when we at least had a subject.

Here

we do not even have that, since subjects could be either
very broad or very narrow.
become then?

What do critical thinking skill

How narrowly or broadly should we take them?

I would like some specific examples to show precisely
what McPeck means by different kinds of knowledge or what
he means by 'subject'.

In "Critical Thinking and

Subject-Specificity Clarification and Needed Research"
Ennis differentiates between 'subject1, 'discipline', and
'domain'.

Sometimes, he points out,

'subject' means

something taught in school and sometimes simply a topic
g

under consideration.

Since McPeck clearly wants critical

thinking to apply to circumstances and situations outside
school, i think we can take it that he holds Ennis's latter
characterization.

However, we do not advance any further

w ith this realization since we do not know what 'topic'
encompasses or how critical thinking skills relate to it.
Eurthermore, even if McPeck would agree with Ennis's
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suitably vague characterization of 'subject', he does not
agree when Ennis characterizes McPeck approach as having
a discipline bias.
that is the case.

7

In Chapter Seven he explicitly denies
For him, subject matter is broader

than the kinds of disciplines we meet in University.
However, even after Ennis's intervention is considered
there is no help for McPeck.

Clarifying McPeck's position

on whether 'subject' refers to only in-school topics does
not clarify what McPeck means by 'subject'.
two possibilities:

I can see

(1) compartmentalizing life into areas

as subjects as in school, i.e. equating it to 'discipline',
as he seems to have been doing in his discussion up until
now, despite his denial, or (2) focusing on broader domains
even broader than religious knowledge and scientific
knowledge, since he means critical thinking to apply to
a pursuit like mountain climbing.

However, to simplify

the matter I will limit this discussion to easily
distinguishable domains like religious belief and scientifi
knowledge.

The breadth of the domains is enough to

illustrate what is wrong with this broad characterization.
Under (1) for example, we would find an issue like
alcoholism divided into its legal, biological,
psychological, cultural, etc. aspects.

Science would be

divided into biology, physics, chemistry, etc. as subjects
with each maintaining its own language, own epistemology,
and own type of good reasons.

We often see McPeck using

axamples that suggest such a reading.
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In (2), I can see how an acceptable type of reason
for belief in a religious context, like faith in the Bible,
knowledge from religious tenets, or talking to God, would
be unacceptable in a scientific context.

In the Christian

tradition commentators, for example, start with the premise
"There is a God" and shape their critical discussions and
base inferences on this premise.

Alternatively, many

philosophers start with the question "Is there a God?"
rather than with the positive assertion that He exists
and their inference base takes an entirely different course.
If McPeck prefers (2), focusing on broader domains,
then he needs to explain what 'subjects' or 'domains' he
has in mind.

The domains are not self-explanatory, and

he does not provide any criteria for deciding what the
limits of a subject are to be nor how to discover them.
And in fact it is unlikely that he means (2) because,
notwithstanding the fact there are no Renaissance men,
McPeck clearly thinks there can be experts in subjects
areas, or at least, individuals who are sufficiently
immersed in the subjects to engage in critical evaluations
which are impossible without understanding that subject.
'Subjects' as set up in (2) are too broad to breed
either experts, unless those purported experts are truly
exceptional people, or people well versed in the subject.
Whoever heard of a scientific expert who could speak with
equal authority in any given scientific area?
as science is a case in point.

Medicine

Someone with a Ph.D. in
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Physics may be an expert in physics, but not in medicine.
Even a medical doctor cannot speak authoritatively in every
area of medicine.

When determining why someone died, a

pathologist makes a better witness in court than a general
practitioner, cardiologist, or neurologist would on the
same topic.

All the above may be scientific experts and

fit into (2)'s science domain, but the domain itself is
too broad for anyone to be well versed in the subject science.

It would seem that 'subject' must refer to

something narrower by far than the type of broad domains
I have suggested.

The problem intensifies if we replace

the domains I used with the even broader domains McPeck's
analysis indicates.
(II)

Reasons and Fallacies

Assuming that the nature of 'subject' has been
established, and whether we take it, by a process of
elimination, to be a discipline' or to be something else
which we have not in actuality discussed, we discover yet
another characterization - this time we need to know what
McPeck means by different types

of reasons.

Knowing and

understanding a subject means we must be able to provide
reasons as to why a certain 'fact' is so; yet, he does
not specify what constitutes a 'reason'.

He needs to

furnish examples of what he considers to be different types
of reasons.

If much of collective human experience is

subject-specific, including what constitutes good reasons,
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as the first quote in this chapter suggests, would it be
outrageous to conclude that types of reasons are also
subject-specific?

I do not think so.

McPeck has argued that what constitutes an instance
Q
of critical thinking depends on the subject matter.
That
is to say, what qualifies a particular instance of thinking
or a particular skill as critical depends upon the subject
and circumstances

surrounding that instance of thinking

or that skill.

critical thinker in art history has the

A

requisite skills and experience to
skills critically

know how to apply those

and, since he is immersed in the field,

when to bring them to bear.

That art historian, if we

assume all he knows is art history, would not qualify as
a critical thinker in the philosophy of religion, because
he would not be immersed in the requisite field; hence,
he would be unable to discern when critical thinking is
needed and what skills to bring to bear.
What constitutes a good reason for a belief, or rather
what constitutes knowing what a good reason is, depends
on the discipline to which the reason belongs.

Our art

historian knows what the best reasons are for placing
Michelangelo amongst the world's great sculptors.

He knows,

for instance, why David is a masterpiece, and its place
in Renaissance art.

Our art historian would not know what

constitutes a good reason in discussions about the
Immaculate Conception, because he would not be steeped
in the epistemology of religious theory.

Conversely,
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someone immersed in religious theory would not thereby
understand what makes Michelangelo, as an artist, great.
It follows that types of reasons are subject-specific.
Those who know the subject have mastered the epistemology
of the discipline and know when a reason is a good one.
Granting that what constitutes a good reason depends
on the subject, the question remains; Are there different
types of reasons and do they have intra-field or inter-field
validity?

Given McPeck's arguments on critical thinking,

it follows that he would have to argue that different
subjects accept different types of reasons.

The type of

factors acceptable as reasons in religion are not, or might
not be, acceptable in art, law, psychology, etc., and vice
versa.

Just as skills and methods belong to separate

subjects, so too do reasons.
This position may become clearer if we examine McPeck's
treatment of informal logic.

Following his account of

Johnson and Blair's description of informal logic in Chapter
Four, McPeck bisects the subject into fallacy theory and
g

argumentation theory.

For the most part his treatment

focuses on fallacy theory.

This treatment will aid us

in understanding the subject-specific nature of reasons,
because in my estimation fallacies exhibit the same logical
behaviour as reasons do.

Informal Logic Fallacies
Informal logic propounds the idea that there are
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identifiable and common errors that occur in the normal
course of reasoning.

These errors (when identified,

labeled, and their conditions formulated) are called
fallacies.

A fallacy applies across subjects.

Once you

know what equivocation is, for example, then, to put it
in its simplest form, you are supposed to realize that
equivocation is the same whatever the discipline.

Informal

logic is meant to be a subject unto itself and applicable
to other subjects; whereas, critical thinking is in McPeck's
view subsumed by the epistemology of subjects.

That basic

difference explains why informal logic allows for
inter-field validity, and McPeck's critical thinking does
not.

Ennis argues that fallacies have bridge-jumping

criteria.

io

That is, their criteria are such that fallacies

apply to many subjects.
McPeck, however, argues that the only thing that
instances of assumption identification, equivocation, ad
hominem, irrelevant reasons, etc. share from subject to
subject is the name.

What counts as an assumption depends

upon the subject in question.

General prescriptions are

unhelpful if you lack a thorough working knowledge of the
field so that you can identify one.
Since McPeck's argument and main premises support
dividing

life into different epistemologies, and since

his characterization of "different kinds of belief", rests
on having "different kinds of good reason supporting
them,"1”1 i must conclude that reasons operate in a similar

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

subject-specific fashion.
'equivocation1.

79
'Reason1 functions like

The name 'reason' applies across various

subjects, but what counts as a reason depends upon the
subject in question.
McPeck, and Johnson and Blair, are seeking two
different things.

Johnson and Blair state that

By the theory of fallacy, we mean the attempt
to formulate with clarity and rigour the
conditions under which a particular fallacy
occurs, along with related question about the
nature and/or existence of various kinds of
fallacy.
Johnson and Blair suggest that there is a lack of progress
on fallacies, such as irrelevant reason, and claim a great
deal of work remains to be done.
they are wrong.

McPeck suggests that

The kind of account Johnson and Blair

require cannot, in principle, be given because "canons
of relevance and standards of adequacy are dependent on
subject m a t t e r . " ^
I believe that McPeck wants all the specific conditions
set out.

By saying that fallacies depend on the subject

in question McPeck would never accept a general account.
He wants to know what makes a case of equivocation, for
example, a instance of equivocation for each subject.
Naturally, it would be impossible to provide for every
eventuality and every subject in a definition.

However,

even he should agree that the nature of equivocation does
not alter, but what makes for an instance of equivocation
does change from subject to subject.

Johnson and Blair

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
are seeking the general nature, not the specific one.
McPeck's criticsms are not telling since he is after
something different from Johnson and Blair.

Simply to

say that they ought to provide what he himself would want
is not enough.
When discussing the theory of argumentation, McPeck
argues informal logicians assume that 1generalizable1,
(which fallacies are purported to be) is equivalent to
'repeatable1.**^

He characterizes

'generalizable* as "a

principle applied in one area of. human experience that
must also apply in others."

15

This, he says, overlooks

the distinction between repeatable in a domain and applying
to several domains.

Fallacies, critical skills, and reasons

can be used again and again (i.e. repeatable) in a domain
or subject and are, in that sense, generalizable; however,
they are not generalizable in the sense that they are
repeatable across several domains.

McPeck employs the

analogy that the rules of one game do not apply in others.

16

The comparison should not be made at the level of
rules of games.

What is most important for our purposes

here is what makes a rule a rule rather than what makes
it a rule of this game rather than a rule of another game.
Perhaps the point would be easier to understand if I put
it on the level of games.

What is important is what makes

a game a game rather than what makes it one particular
game rather than another.

We want to know what it is about

Monopoly, Super Mario Brothers, poker, and baseball that
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Or, to put it back on the level

of rules, what it is about the rules of the games that
makes them all rules.
Fallacies and reasons, in my view, are like games.
Fallacies have criteria, just as games have rules.

Each

fallacy has its own set of criteria, just as each game
has its own set of rules.

However, I am not comparing

a fallacy like equivocation to a game like Monopoly.

I

am comparing a fallacy like equivocation to the concept
of game(s) itself.

Equivocation is general, its criteria

are general, and it applies in many subjects.

The nature

of a game is general, rules which are part of games are
general, and the concept applies to many activities.
McPeck prefers, wrongly I believe, to compare fallacies
(reasons) with individual rules of individual games.

On

those terms he is correct to assert that the rules of one
game do not apply in others, but, as I have said, I believe
this analogy to be misguided.
I have argued that on McPeck's account of things
reasons must be aligned with different subjects, that there
are types of reasons that belong to different areas of
belief, that the concept of 'reasons'

is subject-specific

and hence, conceptually linked to epistemology just as
critical thinking is.
befalls

Whatever happens to epistemology

'reasons' and 'critical thinking'.
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(III) The Analogous Situation Between Rationality,
Epistemologyy and Critical Thinking
McPeck establishes relationships between critical
thinking and a number of other concepts such as,
rationality, epistemology, informal logic, and argument
analysis.

Here we are interested in rationality, critical

thinking, and epistemology.

We have already examined where

he sees that link coming from and why.

We are concerned,

at this time, with how the equation of rationality and
critical thinking connects the equation of epistemology
and critical thinking.

The relationships between the three

concepts and how they support one another is important;
the way McPeck moves from rationality to critical thinking
to epistemology is not so important.

If these concepts

are closely intertwined and some, or all, are based on
faulty assumptions, then just as types of reasons and
fallacies become suspect because of their ill-defined
*
natures, then so too will rationality, which is closely
connected to the latter two concepts.
In Chapter Two McPeck characterizes epistemology as
the
Analyses of good reasons for various beliefs.
Ideally, epistemology attempts to provide the
very best reasons for holding a belief, and to
this extent its purpose is identical with that
of rationality . . . QL€3 includes understanding
concepts and peculiarities of the nature of
evidence, as they are understood by practitioners
in t h e ^ i e l d from which they emanate (italics
mine).
Earlier we saw that McPeck chose not to develop what
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ground that the

complex; however, he did provisionally
;
j

concept was too
describe it as an

"intelligent use of all available evidence for the solution
*|g
of some problem."
We must assume that providing the

j
j

very best reasons for holding a belief

is the same as

;

intelligently using all available evidence to find

a

i

!

solution to a problem.

Remember, McPeck aligns critical

thinking with problem solving and has also placed critical
thinking in the justification process of coming to hold
a belief.
;

i

Since rationality and epistemology share the same
purpose, are we to suppose that rationality is equivalent

i
1

*

to epistemology?

Looking back to McPeck's characterization

of epistemology, we note that he does say that the two
concepts share the same purpose to the extent that

^

epistemology attempts to provide the best reasons for
holding a belief (italics mine).

The phrase "to the extent"

suggests that there are differences.

Unfortunately, if

there are such differences we are not told what they are.
Perhaps McPeck did not provide them because to do so would
include developing the concept of rationality (which I
argued in Chapter One he needs to do); or because he thought
the differences were obvious; or because he did not think
failing to do so would damage his work; or because some
instinct told him to add a qualifying phrase.

Whatever

the reason, we are left with the concepts of rationality
and epistemology sharing the same purpose and lacking any
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We are left with the question, since

there are no obvious differences are the two concepts then
equivalent?

If not equivalent, then since they share the

same purpose, they seem to be related.
and how closely are they related?

In what fashion

If only contingently

rather than necessarily, then if the arguments for one
are proven to be invalid the other concept will have a
reasonable chance of survival; that is, unless it is based
upon some very basic and misguided assumptions underlying
the arguments and characterizations of most of his concepts
- which may very likely prove to be the case here.
Remember also that in Chapter One of Critical Thinking
and Education McPeck claimed that critical thinking is
an aspect of rationality; since there are no visible
differences between McPeck's characterization rationality
and epistemology, then it can be said that it follows that
critical thinking is also an aspect of epistemology.

This

conclusion follows not only because rationality and
epistemology appear to be equivalent (which would naturally
lead to the conclusion that critical thinking shares the
same relationship with both since both would be virtually
the same thing), but because critical thinking is also
connected to rationality by their having a similar purpose.
"The concept of critical thinking merely marks out the
facet of rationality that comprises the disposition, and
skill to find such difficulties in the normal course of
reasoning."

19

The purpose of critical thinking is to
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satisfy the purpose of rationality.

Rationality shares

its purpose with epistemology; therefore, critical
thinking's purpose is epistemology1s purpose.

Since to

satisfy this purpose critical thinking operates as an aspect
of rationality, then to satisfy epistemology1s purpose
critical thinking must be an aspect of epistemology as
well.
It makes a certain amount of sense to suggest that
if critical thinking is to be taught as integral to the
subject and if a subject is to be taught from an
epistemological standpoint, as McPeck wishes, then critical
thinking is an aspect of epistemology.

That is, it makes

a certain amount of sense if we assume that there is more
to epistemology than critical thinking.
On the other hand, in Chapter Two I argued that the
division between critical thinking and rationality is not
as clear-cut as McPeck has made it out to be; therefore,
if we attempt to use the apparent relationship between
critical thinking and rationality to support the
relationship between critical thinking and epistemology
we are at a loss.
The relationship between critical thinking and
epistemology has been developed elsewhere

20

and far more

convincingly than here where the vagueness of 'rationality'
and its linkage to critical thinking provides only weak
support in establishing a conceptual link between critical
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However, the relationship

afforded by that very vagueness and the similar linkage
rationality and epistemology share with critical thinking
make it very clear that if epistemology is proven to be
unworkable so too goes critical thinking and hence
rationality.

Or if critical thinking is proven to be

unworkable, rationality and epistemology will suffer the
same fate.

I do not

if rationality fails

think I need to spell out what happens
- the correlation is pretty clear.

The big question is: Do any of the concepts discussed
prove to be unworkable?
Part V, is yes.

But

The answer, as we shall see in

first we will look at the relationships

between argument analysis,
thinking.

informal logic, and critical

Critical thinking, as we saw, is an aspect of

rationality and of epistemology, but argument analysis
and informal logic are aspects of critical thinking.

(IV) The Relationship Between .Argument Analysis, Informal
Logic and Critical Thinking
No one can anticipate every conclusion or line of
argument that may arise from his arguments.

If it were

possible, then there would be no unwanted or unwelcome
or unwitting conclusions.

But such there are.

more plausible and reasonable than others.

Some are

The consequences

outlined in Chapter Three of this thesis thus far are of
that nature.

There are other conclusions that are not
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McPeck decries informal logic by name rather than
just by its association with argument analysis.

Basically,

he claims that logic as a whole, whether formal or informal,
cannot satisfy the goal of critical thinking because it
stresses form over content and it seeks validity over
relevance and acceptability,

it ignores and demeans the

complex nature of information by treating information as
if it is unambiguous and comprised of 'mere' facts.
The charge that an argument is 'fallacious'
requires first seeing it as having a certain
pattern . . . But then, secondly, it requires
determining whether the particular argument is
of the fallacious or non-fallacious form.
To
determine if an argument contains a fallacy we
must, however, go outside of the forms, so to
speak,9and assess facts and beliefs about the
world.
Unfortunately McPeck's criticisms of logic suffer
from two failings:

(1) they misinterpret the nature of

informal logic and (2) they do not differentiate between
formal and informal logic.

He needs to do so.

We have

already dealt with (1) in Part III, Chapter Two.

To

recapitulate: informal logic takes note of and attempts
to deal with and control for the ambiguities inherent in
language and information.

Like critical thinking, informal

logic works with the content of statements as opposed to
the form they plug into.

Johnson and Blair, who McPeck

uses as the focal point for the fallacy approach, state
that fallacies are concerned with relevancy, sufficiency,
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dealing with arguments is important to critical thinking.
No matter how the two are related, it is unreasonable to
deny the relationship.

Deny it McPeck assuredly would

if he could, but he cannot.

He would prefer to declare

that informal logic as it is conceived does not exist
because it claims to have the impossible inter-field
validity.

However, he makes it clear that argument analysis

does exist and he says that attempts to formulate informal
logic turn out to be nothing more than argument analysis;
therefore, informal logic exists.

34

Unfortunately for

informal logic, for it to exist in McPeck's world, it must
assume a totally different personality from the one informal
theorists intend.

To be facetious about it, informal logic

both exists and does not exist according to McPeck, which
shows his reasoning is inconsistent.
(V) Harvey Siegel on McPeck1s Conceptualization
of Epistemology
In Sections I and II of this Chapter, where I concluded
that McPeck must be using version (1) of what comprises
a 'subject1, i.e. compartmentalizing life into areas as
in subjects in school, to characterize a subject and that
types of reasons are subject-specific.

Knowing that

critical thinking, which is subject-specific, is
conceptually linked with epistemology, I am forced to ask
if the above does not lead to the idea that there must
be separate epistemologies rather than a single
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understanding of "the epistemology of the subject"
- "here we regard this sort of thing as a good
reason" - without understanding why this sort
of a thing should count as a reason here, but
another sort of a thing as a reason there.
McPeck is thus his own worst enemy.

In effect, he

stipulates a new meaning for 'epistemology' without
indicating his intention of doing so; hence, he is judged
on the common understanding of the word.
he intends to offer a new meaning.

I do not believe

I believe he thinks

he means epistemology as it is commonly understood.

We

have more than Siegel's word that McPeck is operating
outside the common understanding of epistemology.
According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, we find
epistemology defined as:
The epistemologist . . . is concerned not with
whether or how we can be said to know some
particular truth but whether we are justified
in claiming knowledge of some whole class of
truths, or, indeed, whether knowledge is possible
at all.
The questions which he asks are therefore
general in a way that questions asked^^ithin
some one branch of knowledge are not.
(italics
mine)
Contrast this definition with the characterization of
epistemology outlined in Section

III (p. 82).

McPeck

specifically states epistemology "includes understanding
concepts and the peculiarities of the nature of evidence,
as they are understood by practitioners in the field from
which they emanate."41 (italics mine)
portion says it all.

The underlined

As Siegel indicated, epistemology

is meant to be general and trans-disciplinary.

It is not
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meant to be subject-specific as McPeck indicates.

Since

McPeck does not expressly indicate he is stipulating a
new meaning for 'epistemology', we must conclude he is
attempting to operate within the established conception
and this ambiguity weakens his account as a result.
(VI) The Consequences of Interlocking Concepts
Siegel could have done more than just weaken McPeck's
account.

By taking his criticisms to their logical

conclusions he could have invalidated McPeck's concept
of critical thinking.

Although he did not, I will.

Let's review what has been argued thus far.

In Chapter

Two we learned that according to McPeck there are no
generalized, trans-disciplinary skills, that critical
thinking does not comprise such skills, that critical
thinking and critical thinking skills are subject-specific
and that critical thinking is conceptually linked with
epistemology.
foundation.

These points are the cornerstones of McPeck's
All his ideas about how matters develop in

the rational/intellectual/thinking community rest on them.
The last sentence also contains an extremely important
proposition.
The overview of Chapter Three up to this point reveals
that McPeck argues for and from a network of terms.
Epistemology is connected to reasons, critical thinking,
belief, and rationality.
thinking and epistemology.

Rationality is related to critical
And finally, critical thinking
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connects directly with rationality, epistemology, argument
analysis, and informal logic.

Thus, all the above terms,

which draw their mandate from Chapter Two, are conceptually
linked with each other.

As I have stated thus far in this

chapter,this interconnectedness can lead to the devolution
of McPeck's theories, because these concepts are all based
on the same misguided assumptions.
In Section IV of this chapter we saw that McPeck would
have to allow, on his own terms, that informal logic exists.
It simply does not happen to be critical thinking.

In

Part IV we also saw Siegel aptly illustrating that McPeck
distorted the concept of epistemology by making the theory
of epistemology into separate theories of epistemology.
The word 'epistemology' functions, then, like the word
'reason' or the various fallacy labels.

We use the same

name to refer to disparate things; they share only the
name.

Epistemology turns out to be subject-specific.

We could probably have reached this conclusion much sooner
by noting that reasons are subject-specific and epistemology
provides the best reasons for belief; hence, we may have
concluded, with a certain amount of trepidation at taking
this large a leap, that epistemology is subject-specific
as well.
(1) Rationality
Notwithstanding the might-have-beens, what becomes
clear is that the concept of epistemology does not work
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as it is supposed to do and that it takes the remaining
interlocking concepts with it.

To begin with, rationality

follows the path laid down by epistemology, whether the
two are equivalent or not, simply by sharing the same
purpose.

To intelligently draw on all available evidence

in order to solve a problem means drawing on all the
relevant evidence.
What constitutes 'relevant evidence' and where does
it come from?

In "Paul's Critique of Critical Thinking

and Education" McPeck holds, according to Paul, that
Since there is a large number of logical domains
and we can be trained only in a few of them,
it follows that we must use our own critical
judgment and/or defer to experts when we ourselves
are not expert.
It leaves little room for the
classical concept of the liberally educated person
as having skills of learg^ng that are general
and not domain specific.
Paul counters that the world is not divided into logical
categories; human thought divides it up and it may be
divided in an indefinite number of ways.

Concepts and

lines of reasoning lying clearly in one domain lay
simultaneously and equally clearly in others.

Critical

thought is most important in our system of values and
interpretative schemes.

A small percentage of time is

spent judging as specialists and we give broader meaning
to those acts.

For example, a businessman may

interpret/assess schools on a business model, military
personnel on a disciplinarian model, etc.

Paul's

prescription for rationality is to think critically about
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how we

1 00
'totalize' and use our experience.

"We need to

pay special attention to those general skills of
critical-cross-examination,

for they are what enable us

to maintain our autonomous judgment in the midst of
experts."

43

McPeck's theory of critical thinking does not allow
us to ask multi-categorical questions that cut across
disciplines.

Yet what is required is a reasoned perspective

from a 'global' view.
dialectical,
of argument.

Most social and world problems are

says Paul, and are settled by general canons
From a logical atomist's viewpoint, where

everything is placed in appropriate categories (Paul labels
McPeck a logical atomist), dialectical, multi-categorical
questions are anomolous; "When noticed the tendency is
to try to fabricate specialized categories for them or
to break them down into a summary complex of
mono-categorical elements.
Questions, such as the justification of the invasion
of Grenada, draw upon many disciplines for answers.

In

this instance, Paul states that in an attempt to reach
an answer the disputants explored questions of morality,
interpreting international law, spheres of influence, etc.
Furthermore, such questions permeate everyday life.^5
McPeck agrees that there are problems that lie in
several domains (to use Paul's terminology) and are
roulti-categorical; however, McPeck has a problem with how
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domain-specific knowledge and understanding function to
solve real problems.

The nature of the problem determines

which domain(s) will be required.

46

Different kinds of

knowledge are necessary to appreciate the different
dimensions of most problems and no single set of skills
or clump of specific knowledge will resolve them.

47

McPeck uses the issue of alcoholism to explain what
he means.

When we raise a question about alcoholism it

is a specific question and requires a specific kind of
answer, using a specific kind of knowledge.

If we wish

to know how widespread it is, we are seeking sociological
knowledge.

If we wish to know if it is right or wrong,

we are seeking moral knowledge.

He grants that one kind

of knowledge can affect other beliefs; for instance, if
alcoholism is a disease, then it is not a sin.
words, what constitutes

48

In other

'relevant evidence' depends on

the subject, as we might expect from the development of
his conception of critical thinking.

To fulfill

rationality's purpose, to be rational, comes down to being
rational in a subject, just as epistemology depends on
subject-matter.

Therefore, whether we reach this conclusion

by way of the previous argument using the analogy with
epistemology, rationality becomes a series of rationalities;
rationality is subject-specific; the only thing rationality
shares across subjects is the name.
I do not think it is outrageous to suggest that "the
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intelligent use" of the evidence involves actually knowing
and understanding the subject under consideration well
enough to evaluate the evidence so that the conclusion
you reach is not overly simplistic.

The requirements for

being a critical thinker, which is an aspect of rationality,
are stringent.

To have even a minimal understanding of

a subject we must understand its often technical language
- which, to my mind, includes knowing how and when to use
it as well as knowing how to use the terms.

If the

requirements for a minimal condition of understanding are
so stringent for an aspect of rationality, then the
requirements for intelligently using evidence must.be
equally stringent.
Unhappily the conclusion that follows this line of
reasoning is not one that anyone would wish to claim.
If intelligently using evidence is as difficult in this
age lacking Renaissance men as I have made out, then,
despite McPeck's protestations to the contrary,

49

only

experts or near experts could meet this requirement.

Only

they could be described as rational because only they could
be rational in their subject.

However, they would only

be rational in their areas of expertise.

They, like the

rest of us, would not be rational most of the time since
they could only spend a fraction of their time in their
subjects.

Those of us who are merely mediocre in

everything, who only live our lives as comfortably and
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satisfactorily as we can, would be not be rational at
all.Since most of the world's population is merely mediocre,
most of the world is not rational most of the time.

We

would be forced to depend on experts whenever any difficulty
arose.

The trouble with that is that not even experts

agree all of the time.

Not being experts ourselves, how

would we choose between two, or possibly more, conflicting
viewpoints among the experts themselves.

We, and they,

would become stagnant - unable to do or decide anything
at all.
We could take this one step further.

McPeck tells

us that rationality involves intelligently using evidence
for the solution of some problem.

He has not placed any

limits on the scope of the problem, so we could say that
experts are needed to solve problems of any degree of
difficulty.

In that case, who shall we go to when we must

decide between brands of toilet paper?

Perhaps a discipline

will spring up and we will have professors in bathrrom
products.

Life as we know it would come to a standstill

since we would need experts in everything to function.
The above argument not only sounds absurd, it is
absurd; however, any number of absurdities follow from
construing rationality as McPeck does.
overall judgments about rationality.

Basically, we make
A person is judged

to be on the whole rational or on the whole not rational,
not rational in this subject and not rational in that
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because he lacks relevant understanding.

It even sounds

ridiculous to judge a person's rationality, or lack thereof,
on how much they know.

Perhaps McPeck means something

different for 'intelligent use of evidence1; however, his
discussions of who can know enough to formulate sound
beliefs and use evidence properly leads me to believe that
the phrase is grounded in the acquisition and manipulation
of knowledge.
Understand, JT am not suggesting that McPeck agrees
with

the concept of rationality as I have laid it down.

On the contrary, he more than likely subscribes to
rationality as an overall characteristic, as I outlined
in the last paragraph.

What I am suggesting is that his

arguments about epistemology, about subject-specificity,
about rationality, and about the relationships among them
do lead to the conclusion that rationality is
subject-specific - with all that that entails.

The absurd

conclusions drawn from its subject-specific nature were
taken to the nth degree, but doing so illustrated
effectively how far astray McPeck's arguments can go.
(2) Critical Thinking
The next, most obvious concept to confront is critical
thinking itself, because it is an aspect of epistemology
and rationality, while argument analysis and informal logic
turn out to be aspects of critical thinking.

Since I have

established the very real linkage betwixt the terms McPeck
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uses I will, for purposes of continuity, demonstrate how
critical thinking is subject to the same unwelcome forces
as epistemology and rationality.

As with the other two

concepts, critical thinking will turn out to be a label
only.

The concepts of critical thinking across subjects

are being linked only by that name.
In truth I could illustrate the above point without
reference to epistemology and rationality.

I could simply

examine the nature of critical thinking as McPeck has
revealed it to us.

However my arguments will appear more

conclusive by displaying all the links in the chain.

To

be thorough, I will show what is going wrong with McPeck's
concept both by examining and directly extrapolating on
his arguments for critical thinking and by displaying how
the arguments against epistemology and rationality encompass
critical thinking.
First, we will examine McPeck's arguments for critical
thinking.

In Chapter Two where we developed those

arguments, we discovered McPeck's claim that critical
thinking is subject-specific.

That was his most important

conclusion, and it sets him apart from many other critical
thinking theorists who believe critical thinking is a
subject unto itself.

If we stop and think about the

implications of this conclusion, we realize that that means
critical thinking is an aspect of various subjects.

As

we have seen, what counts as good reasons alters with the
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subject, sometimes how one reasons alters with the subject;
therefore, the nature and criteria of critical thinking
differs according to the subject.

Seeing this we must

ask ourselves, what is critical thinking?
McPeck's answer is contained in his two definitions.
We will use the first to illustrate how well they satisfy
the question.

According to the first definition, critical

thinking is "the propensity and skill to engage in an
activity with reflective s k e p t i c i s m . A s

you may recall,

there were problems with this definition even when the
features of critical thinking were attached; namely, an
inability to decide what skills to bring to bear and a
lack of clarity on "reflective skepticism."
To see that McPeck's concept and definitions become
nothing more than empty labels we will look at Johnson
and Blair's characterization of the fallacy faulty analogy.
1. An analogy is offered in support of the
conclusion of an argument".
2. The two things being compared are not similar
in the respg<j:t required to support the
conclusion.
McPeck stresses that fallacies are so general as to be
useless when used in particular situations.

He stresses

that what constitutes faulty analogy depends on the subject
matter.

Well, McPeck's definitions of critical thinking

have the same flaw.

They are necessarily so general to

encompass cases of critical thinking in all subjects that
they are useless in indicating when or how critical thinking
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takes place within those subjects.

To assert that critical

thinking occurs when an activity is approached with
reflective skepticism, when the time to do so is right,
avails us nothing.

We cannot tell when an activity is

so broached because McPeck has given us no guidelines to
make that judgment.

Nor do we know what skills to bring

to bear, how to judge when the time is ripe to do so, nor
when we ought to suspend judgment about the norms of the
subjects themselves.
Thus, McPeck's characterization of critical thinking
as subject-specific has placed him in a trap.

Critical

thinking comes to operate as McPeck believes informal logic
fallacies do.

It becomes nothing more than a label

describing potentially many disparate concepts that share
nothing but the name.

To paraphrase Harvey Siegel: critical

thinking is to be replaced by a series of critical thinking
concepts.

52

What McPeck has given us are general

prescriptions which, to pursue my own analogy with fallacy
theory, can only serve to mislead us.

Since McPeck makes

critical thinking an important part of the process of
education, he would need to provide more than a general
prescription.

He ought to outline what the concept of

critical thinking is and how it operates within each subject
since the nature of critical thinking changes from subject
to subject.
Next, taking the more torturous path, we will look
at c r i t i c a l thinking's downfall via its connection to the
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rest of the terms in the Network.

As we have seen, critical

thinking is an aspect of both epistemology and rationality,
while informal logic and argument analysis also fall under
critical thinking's auspices.

Since critical thinking,

epistemology, and rationality all ultimately proved to
be unworkable since they are all founded on the same
misguided premises and since all three are so closely
connected that damaging one ultimately damages all, it
is not unreasonable to suggest that those concepts that
are aspects of critical thinking and that rest on the same
faulty premises would suffer similar fates.
McPeck's use of 'epistemology' became vulnerable
because his characterization led to the conclusion that
there is no one single concept of epistemology.

In effect

there are separate concepts of epistemology corresponding
to various subjects.

The nature of epistemology alters

with each subject, and the only thing connecting the various
epistemologies is the name 'epistemology'

itself.

Due

to its connection to epistemology as well as to its reliance
on the same premises supporting epistemology and critical
thinking, rationality also divides into a series of
separate, subject-dependent rationalities.
one concept of rationality.

There is no

The nature of rationality

alters with each subject and the only thing connecting
the various rationalities is the name 'rationality' itself.
Critical thinking, being an aspect of the two former
concepts, is naturally subject to the same constraints.
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Thus, as the nature of critical thinking alters with changes
in the natures of epistemology and rationality, we are
forced to conclude that there is no one single concept
of critical thinking.

McPeck is left once more with

separate concepts of critical thinking whose sole link
is the label

'critical thinking1 itself.

(3) Informal Logic and Argument Analysis
We can take this line of reasoning two steps further
by showing how informal logic and argument analysis also
fail because they are aspects of critical thinking ignoring for the moment that McPeck would prefer to say
that informal logic does not exist at all.

As critical

thinking is constrained by the same limits imposed on
epistemology and rationality because it functions as an
aspect of them, so too are informal logic and argument
analysis constrained by the limits imposed on critical
thinking.

Needless to say, those operational limits

initially originate from epistemology and rationality.
Thus, informal logic and argument analysis do not
refer to single concepts applicable across subjects
(remembering that informal logic would not be informal
logic as we know it for it to exist in McPeck's universe).
If critical thinking, to which they are so completely tied,
cannot function as a single concept and must manifest itself
differently in each subject, then its subsidiaries cannot
either.

The nature of informal logic and argument analysis
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Therefore, there are as

many concepts of informal logic and argument analysis as
there are subjects.

The only thing connecting the sundry

concepts of informal logic and argument analysis are the
names.
(4) The Demise of McPeck*s Conception of Critical Thinking
McPeck's concept of critical thinking has lost much
of its force due to its interconnectedness with other
ill-defined terms in the rational firmament and due to
the flaws arising from its reliance on subject-specificity.
Moreover, when critical thinking turned out to be separate
critical thinking concepts rather than one generalized
concept, McPeck nullified his own project.

He had intended

to proffer the analysis of the concept of critical thinking
that has been lacking in the critical thinking literature.
He did not intend to offer one analysis of one of
potentially many concepts of critical thinking.

This stance

is evident when we realize that if the latter rather than
the former were the case, McPeck would have identified
not only which subjects the concept belonged to, but the
definitions and explanations would have been specific enough
to identify what kind of skills count as critical in each
subject, and why.

As matters stand the concept offered

for our perusal is vague and, on a practical level, useless.
Practicality is not only desired but also essential
because McPeck associates it with the concept of education.
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He may have said that education does not necessarily
coincide with schools,

53

which constitute the practical

aspect of education; however, when people, including McPeck,
discuss education and improvements in education they are
talking about improving the educational system.
talking about schools.
practicalities.

They are

They are talking about

McPeck is talking about practicalities.

In his alliance of critical thinking and education, he
makes it clear that the best way to create critical thinkers
is by promoting a liberal education based on an
epistemological framework.

54

That is a practical suggestion

for inculcating critical thinking.

When he notes in the

final chapter of Critical Thinking and Education that
critical thinking transcends schools based on education
and can belong just as well in other types of schools,
such as training schools,

55

McPeck again acknowledges that

the practical side of critical thinking needs to be
addressed in his discussion.

Skill or skills,

subject-specific or not, critical thinking is meant to
be used, not just to sit there like some appealing yet
otherworldly notion with no solid foundation.
be shortsighted not to recognize this fact.

It would
Any conception

that ignores this aspect of critical thinking would be
seriously damaged.

McPeck's conception does ignore this

aspect of critical thinking and is damaged as a result.
Furthermore, from the results of my analysis of
McPeck's concept of critical thinking and its underlying
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arguments, I must conclude that McPeck has shown himself
to be inconsistent and to tacitly support standard
theorists.

Assuming McPeck is not only outlining what

critical thinking means but is doing so in a critical manner
(an assumption I think he would be loathe to deny), we
must then ask ourselves - to what subject does his project
belong?

Critical thinking, after all, must be critical

thinking in some subject.

It cannot be education, although

the concept of education and the concept of critical
thinking are related, because McPeck clearly intends his
concept of critical thinking to apply to many subjects,
not just to education.

Since the project does not. belong

to education, and it is meant to apply to many subjects,
then it can only apply to the subject of critical thinking.
There is nothing else.
Yet critical thinking does not exist as a subject
for McPeck.

This fact puts us in a quandary.

Clearly

he intends his concept to apply across subjects.

Yet just

as clearly he denies that such a situation is possible.
McPeck argued informal logic into non-existence based partly
on its trans-disciplinary pretensions.

Critical thinking

became, not one concept but a set of separate concepts
subsumed by various subjects, so it could not apply across
subjects nor could it be a subject unto itself as standard
theorists argue.

By arguing the position that critical

thinking is subject-specific while arguing from the position
that critical thinking is a subject McPeck shows himself
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to be inconsistent.
(VII) Summary
This chapter has shown that McPeck's project, analyzing
and establishing the concept of critical thinking, does
not work.

In addition to the counter-arguments offered

against indivdual points in the literature come my concerns
about the consequences attendant upon identifying concepts
solely as subject-specific.

Between the arguments McPeck

employs and the language he uses, critical thinking proves
to be a series of separate critical thinking concepts rather
than an overriding, inter-disciplinary concept as McPeck
needs it to be for it to be effective.

As we have seen,

this makes his account inconsistent and effectively quashes
his concept of critical thinking.
Worse yet for McPeck, his employment and delineation
of terms related to critical thinking, like rationality
and epistemology, in order to"explain critical thinking
contribute to the above conclusion due to their vagueness
and reliance on the same weak premises that the concept
of critical thinking itself rests on.

To explain critical

thinking by referring to other terms we can expect that
(1) there are differences between the terms,

(2) McPeck

knows the differences and the similarities, and (3) he
clearly expresses them.

Because he fails to do so, we

can plausibly read connections and consequences into his
arguments that he does not intend, may not see, and would
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wish to avoid.

This is the situation we meet with in his

explication of critical thinking.
Moreover, when one term is subsumed by another, and
when both terms depend on different subjects for the forms
they take, the link between the two terms becomes that
much closer.

For example, McPeck's conception of critical

thinking would not suffer so much if it were not dependent
upon epistemology; and if, moreover, both concepts did
not draw their mandates from the same weak arguments for
subject-specificity.

That being the case, when one term

or concept, especially the dominant concept, proves to
be contradictory, inconsistent, or weak, then the .other
term suffers in the same fashion.

For example, when

epistemology was damaged, so too was critical thinking.
This situation led to a chain reaction affecting
epistemology, rationality, critical thinking, reasons,
informal logic, and argument analysis.

Drawing out the

connections between them and then illustrating how each
term falls on its own and how one term leads inexorably
to the downfall of another and another and another in the
network constitutes serious blows to McPeck's project as
a whole.

As more terms collapse in on themselves the more

unlikely it becomes that his basic assumptions are correct;
the more unlikely it is that he will be able to refurbish
or reinforce the arguments he initially offered in
establishing the network.

Thus I must conclude that

McPeck's project, as well intentioned as it is, does not
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work and will not work without a massive overhauling.
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CONCLUSION
BACK TO BASICS
As a rule it is easier to destroy than to build.
After centuries of conquering and maintaining territory,
the Roman Empire fell in what amounts to a heartbeat.
The same can be said for the lifestyle in the Southern
United States.

The basis of culture, the economy, the

'aristocratic1 citizens, everything that made the South
the South disappeared within the space of five years.
The American Civil War quickly leveled a system and cities
which took years to build.

A building that took months

to erect topples in hours or minutes when faced with a
wrecking ball or judiciously applied explosives.

The time

and painstaking effort expended on creating a house of
cards is all for naught when someone gives one quick puff.
The house comes tumbling down.
The same can be said for building a theory.
time and effort go into discovering,

Enormous

for want of a better

term, an idea, seeking arguments in its favour and
supporting them, anticipating and circumventing possible
objections, and relating this theory to others in its field.
That is to say nothing of setting it down in full, ready
to be analyzed and criticized.

The analysis and criticism,

11 6
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which in some cases amounts to the destruction, of the

new theory takes qualitatively less time and less trouble.
McPeck put much more into constructing his concept of
critical thinking than I or anyone else did in an attempt
to eradicate it.

For this reason I think it is important

to do more than show what is wrong with McPeck's theory,
I think it is important to illustrate what is right with
his theory as well.

He does have several good ideas that

have been largely ignored in the literature, which has
largely concentrated on where it goes wrong.

To do McPeck

justice we should sort through the wreckage and salvage
what we can of his intentions and his theory.
It is for this reason that I have called this Chapter
"Back to Basics" in contrast to M c P e c k 1s concluding Chapter
"Forward to Basics."

McPeck had imagined that his

conception of critical thinking could be used as the basis
upon which the critical thinking of specific subjects could
be built; hence, we would be moving forward in establishing
the basics for each subject.
I would Q^IcPeck says]] envisage courses that
included the epistemology of a subject as an
integral part of that subject.
In a very real
sense, approaching subjects in this way might
be seen as moving forward to basics.
It would
be moving forward in the sense that our conception
of what it would mean to teach a subject would
change to include its epistemology as a
fundamental component.
And it would be teaching
basics in the sense that there is no understanding
more basic than that which epistemology provides.
Normally when people refer to 'getting back to the basics'
in schools, they mean returning to the three R's - reading,
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writing, and 'rithmetic - or to some other vision of what
schools, most properly, stressed in the past and which
they do not stress now.
into this tradition.

McPeck's "Forward to Basics" taps

In it he expresses his wish that

students in schools are taught correctly in order to create
as well rounded critical thinkers as is possible these
days.

A liberal education is sometimes called for by those

who yearn for returning to the basics.
I am suggesting that McPeck needs to return to the
basics of his conception and if, upon re-examination, he
finds his basic assumptions remain worthwhile, then to
begin his work anew.

It remains to be seen which .ideas

of his are salvageable, whether they are compatible on
first glance, and what the next step McPeck needs to take
is.
(I)

Rebuilding the Foundation

The first thing to establish is that the core of his
project is correct.

What I called the ground upon which

McPeck built his initial foundation remains intact; namely,
there is a concept of critical thinking waiting to be
revealed, and our concern is with discovering or
establishing how it is manifested.
None of the four premises McPeck argues for and from
are commonly accepted or sufficiently supported to be
accepted.

These premises were:

about something in particular;

(1) thinking is always
(2) there is no generalized
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set of skill(s) called critical thinking;

(3) critical

thinking is subject-specific; and (4) critical thinking
is conceptually linked to epistemology.

In Chapter Two

we examined a few of many strong challenges directed against
them.

He needs to reassess these premises and if he still

believes they are necessary, then to try to clarify why
they are essential and why they do the job.
McPeck does better when he cites the features which
critical thinking must take account of.

They have value

and advance analyses of critical thinking.
in

As I stated

Section IV, Chapter Two, I agree with the first feature

that stresses not limiting critical thinking to the
assessment of statements.

To his credit McPeck builds

this idea into his first definition which states that
critical thinking involves "the propensity and skill to
engage in an activity with reflective skepticism"
mine).

(italics

However, apart from the fact that he does not

develop non-statement critical thinking, I find some of
the activities he lists as requiring critical thinking
to be suspect.
For example, McPeck states that mountain climbing
and competitive wrestling are two activities involving
critical thinking.

Upon reflection I must disagree.

These

activities depend upon doing rather than thinking about
doing.

When climbing a mountain most of your attention

is directed at holding onto the rock, getting solid purchase
for your feet, driving in the pitons.

You are focused
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The same can be said for
When grappling with an opponent

most of your attention is directed at the physical
challenge.

Little, if any, time can be called reflective

or skeptical, let alone reflectively skeptical.

Although

it may be the case that a climber or wrestler reflects
on the route and fighting approach beforehand, during either
event, when there actually is a problem to be solved,
reflection is largely absent.

When the initial strategy

does not work or when they encounter minor difficulties
the climber and wrestler do not have time to reflect
skeptically on various alternatives, but must simply react.
Thus I would argue that some activities do not require
critical thinking since they are reactive or reflexive
rather than reflective.
Nevertheless, McP e c k 1s point about critical thinking
involving more than assessing ..statements remains in force.
He only needs to expand on this idea by showing how critical
thinking functions in a non-statement form and by
establishing, not just listing, the types of activities
this concept would be used on and why.
The second, third, fourth, and fifth features also
reflect what a concept of critical thinking needs to account
for and for the reasons espoused in
Two.

Section IV, Chapter

Namely, I am referring to the fact that critical

thinking is voluntary and directed, a task not an
achievement concept, skills admit of degrees, and that
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the notion of "correctness1 is inappropriate in a concept
of critical thinking.
The sixth feature, that critical thinking is equivalent
to rationality, has proven to be misguided as McPeck has
developed it in Critical Thinking and Education, but McPeck
is to be commended for recognizing and trying to correct
the problems that arise due to the opacity of related terms.
He is to be commended for trying to remove the opacity
even if his attempt failed.

In this case, McPeck needs

to develop thoroughly the differences and similarities
among related terms if he wishes to link any of the concepts
together to use their relationship to explain critical
thinking.
The seventh feature implicitly linking creative and
critical thinking should be explicitly made.

Without this

linkage, critical thinking suffers the same fate as logic
in McPeck"s discussion of the context of discovery and
the context of justification.

Logic, he says, belongs

to the context of justification and cannot initiate
hypotheses."^

Critical thinking suffers a similar fate

when divorced from creative thinking - which would be
necessary for considering alternative solutions to problems.
In his discussion of the contexts of discovery and
justification we see, once again, an implicit alignment
of creative and critical thinking when McPeck argues that
the division is too exclusive and discovery (creative
thinking) needs to mix with justification (critical
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thinking).
Finally, McPeck is correct in his tenth feature where
he stresses that critical thinking cannot be identified
with any form of logic.
and informal logic.

I assume he means both formal

Critical thinking, if it is supposed

to be a concept unto itself, must have its own identity.
However, I cannot agree that logic is in no way related
to critical thinking.

Even McPeck admits formal logic

plays a small role in critical thinking.
is not no role at all.

4

A small role

And although he asserted that

informal logic does not exist, he must admit that some
of its concerns are critical thinking's concerns.- For
instance, both are interested in the acceptability of
evidence offered for some position.
McPeck's two definitions, when considered alone, do
not

seem superior to or appreciably different from others

in the literature.
traits.

On the fac.e of it, they share certain

As I stated in Section III, Chapter Two,

no one

writing in the field of critical thinking has offered any
negative commentary on the second definition.

The first

definition, while suffering from vagueness regarding
propensity and skill and needing clarification, does not
necessarily lead to the alliance of critical thinking and
subject-specificity.

Ennis also aligns critical thinking

with reflective thinking without its becoming
subject-specific.4

The question remains: what makes

critical thinking different from reflective thinking?
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There are other good points worth mentioning in
McPeck1s theory.

First, knowledge/information is, as McPeck

pointed out, complex, and assessment requirements mainly
involve understanding the information and its complex
relationships.

It is more important to know what P and

Q mean rather than the logical relations between them.
Logical relations do not decide real public issues, the
acceptability, relevancy, and sufficiency of information
do.
Second, coming to a reasoned conclusion, whether it
be the resolution of some problem or the acceptance of
one hypothesis over another, depends upon understanding
the evidence to those who understand it.
Third, I concede that using criteria depends on
content, whether critical thinking is seen as
subject-specific or not.

We must remember that critical

thinking admits of degrees; hence, a person may be a more
effective critical thinker in one subject than in another.
That does not mean criteria cannot be inter-disciplinary.
Finally, transfer of training has not been
substantiated.

Studies exist supporting both points of

view - that transfer of training occurs and that it does
not occur.

Furthermore, logical subsumption ought not

to be confused with psychological transfer.

The same or

similar logical rules might apply from subject to subject;
however, that does not mean a person can apply them equally
as well from subject to subject.
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(II) Mc P e c k 's Conclusion Versus My Conclusion
McPeck concludes that critical thinking is
subject-specific and that different
areas/activities/subjects have different criteria.

Based

upon his arguments for subject-specificity, his peers'
arguments against it, and my own intuitive understanding
of critical thinking (intuitions being from whence critical
thinking theories ultimately derive) I am forced to conclude
that different subjects do, as McPeck suggests, have
different criteria.

But, and this is a big 'but', McPeck

has gone too far in compensating for information having
been ignored in the past to himself ignoring the
similarities of assessment among subjects.
As things stand, with Mc P e c k 1s conception we cannot
identify the field or subject that McPeck's criticisms
and theories belong to.

Critical thinking does not stand

as a subject unto itself so they do not belong to critical
thinking.

He was not discussing critical thinking as part

of any specific subject, not even education.

The criticisms

I directed at his theories suffer the same fate.

When

I accused him of setting up straw men in his attempts to
defeat informal logic, I employed an informal logic fallacy.
The fallacy was drawn from a non-existent subject and was
applied to an non-existent one.
Presseisen, Chambers, Ennis, and Selman have reached
a conclusion that I believe is acceptable.

All four
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recognize the justice of McPeck's position.

There are

subjects that have unique criteria and must be assessed
in unique ways; however, there are also criteria that cross
such boundaries.

Ergo, both sides are correct and have

had one half of the answer all along.

There are

inter-field/discipline/subject and
intra-field/discipline/subject skills and criteria.

Nothing

matches an in-depth understanding of a subject, but an
understanding of basic critical thinking skills and
principles helps us get through life without having to
enslave ourselves to experts.
(C) Overall Assessment
We have seen that McPeck"s conception of critical
thinking contains some good points, some of which have
been subsumed by the standard approach.

By and large,

however, his conception and his analysis fail to live up
to his promises and the expectations they give rise to.
He promised an analysis of the concept of critical thinking
in order to delineate finally what critical thinking does
and does not include, yet, his arguments inexorably lead
to the conclusion that there is no unary concept.

This

being the case, there cannot be an analysis of the type
he promised.

The nature of critical thinking, the kinds

of things it includes and does not include, will depend
on the subject being critically thought about.

The four

premises McPeck based his argument on were never firmly
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(We saw some of the reasons why, but did

not concentrate on the various arguments as standard
commentators normally do.)

He promised to separate the

concept of critical thinking from other, related ones,
but he did not do so adequately.

The concepts became so

closely intertwined that they suffered from the same malady
afflicting critical thinking.

Thus, I conclude that

McPeck's analysis suffers from two maladies - inconsistency
and imprecision.
The family business so lovingly established by Ennis
and inherited by Paul survived the prodigal son's
competiton.

McPeck's

'family' utilized some of his better

ideas in their own business and reinforced its share of
the market.

McPeck should be proud that he has affected

the standard approach to such a degree; although, I do
not believe he would be satisfied.

If he wishes to become

a long-term force, he will have to identify and utilize
his strong points to begin anew.
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